Lagniappe
Michael
McFaul: Putin?
Really?
Time
magazine gives Vladimir Putin way too much credit for Russia's
economic
recovery.
As an exercise in journalism, Time's annual selection of a "Person
of the Year" has always been a strange ritual. Although
the magazine annually devotes gobs of resources and dozens of
print pages to selecting and reporting on a winner, the editors
take great pains to emphasize that the choice is not an "honor." Rather,
as Managing Editor Richard Stengel explains, the selection goes
to "the person who has most profoundly influenced the world
during the past year, for better or for worse." That Stalin
and Hitler are previous winners underscores Stengel's point.
But leaving
aside the value of journalists engaging in a process that is
a "subjective one," which includes "no
measuring stick or algorithm" but just "feels right" and
ends up choosing Stalin (twice), this year's selection of Russian
President Vladimir Putin is particularly odd, if only judged
by the criteria that Time editors themselves establish. The selection
of Putin is based on a theory about recent Russian history that
is simple, powerful, and wrong.
In the 1990s,
so the Time story goes, Russia was a place of lawlessness,
economic depression, and instability. In the last
decade, however, Russia has become a place of order, economic
growth, and stability. The cause for the change: Putin. As Stengel
theorizes, "Individuals can make a difference to history,
and Russia's Vladimir Putin, our choice for 2007, proves the
point."
Time's theory
about Putin and Russia contains three central flaws. First,
the positive change so trumpeted is exaggerated.
Second, the positive change that has occurred between the 1990s
and the last several years has little if anything to do with
Putin. Third, the Time theory that Putin's democratic rollback
has been a necessary condition for achieving stability and growth—they
call it the "grand bargain"—is simply wrong.
In fact, there is no evidence at all—and most certainly
not in the 36 pages Time devotes to Putin and his Russia—that
greater autocracy has caused either order or growth. Autocracy's
re-emergence under Putin has coincided with tremendous economic
growth but has not caused it. If anything, Putin's autocratic
turn has reduced the economic gains from what they would have
been had democracy survived.
In proving
Putin's greatness, the word stability appears most often in
the Time coverage; on his "report card," this
is the only subject in which Putin gets an A. But finding evidence
of this new stability, both in Time's reporting and in reality,
is difficult. Time writers conflate "central authority" with "stability," a
real no-no in my business of political science, since there are
lots of autocracies in the world that do not provide stability
(think of Angola, among other examples). Lower crime rates, less
corruption, fewer terrorist attacks, better health conditions,
or more secure property rights are some conventional measures
of strong, stable government, yet Putin's Russia has made amazingly
little or no progress on any of these indicators, despite eight
years of economic growth.
The only hard evidence of stability in the Putin era is economic
growth. During Putin's tenure, growth in Russia has averaged
an impressive 6.7 percent; real disposable income has increased
by more than 10 percent a year; consumer spending has skyrocketed;
unemployment has fallen from 12 percent to 6 percent; and poverty,
according to one measure, has declined from 41 percent to 14
percent. Russians have never been richer. Public opinion polls
show that this economic growth, after a decade of recession,
makes Russians feel more stable and better off compared to the
Yeltsin era.
But did Putin
have anything to do with this recovery? Surprisingly, for a
theory based on the role of the individual in making history,
Time's writers use almost no "action verbs" to describe
Putin's economic policies. And there's a reason that Putin seems
like an observer, rather than an actor, in this central drama
of his era: It's because he was one.
Russia's economic transformation from communism to capitalism
followed a very similar pattern to all countries in the region.
Given the dreadful initial economic conditions, every post-Communist
government was compelled to pursue some degree of price and trade
liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, and eventually privatization.
The entire region experienced economic recession and then began
to recover several years after the adoption of reforms. Russia
followed this same general trajectory and would have done so
under Putin or Yeltsin. Had Putin become president or prime minister
in January 1992, he would never have appeared on the cover of
Time.
Russia's economic turnaround came after a financial meltdown
in August 1998 that finally forced the Russian government to
pursue prudent fiscal policies and a more rational exchange-rate
policy, including a major devaluation. As a result of these painful
but necessary reforms, Russia's economy finally began to grow
a year before Putin came to power.
In addition to coming to power well after the painful reforms
necessary to jump-start growth had been implemented, Putin benefited
from another force not of his making: rising world oil prices.
As the price of oil moved from $10 a barrel in 1998 to over $90
a barrel today, anyone in the Kremlin would have reaped the credit
for Russia's economic recovery. But is being in the right place
at the right time "leadership—bold, earth-changing
leadership"? Putin did implement some important tax reforms
and established a stabilization fund to ensure that the windfall
revenues would not be spent frivolously or in an inflationary
manner. The main drivers of Russia's economic rebirth, however,
were world commodity prices, not Putin's leadership.
In fact,
the change in which Putin's leadership is most apparent—growing
autocratic rule—has slowed economic growth, not spurred
it. Corruption, a drag on growth, has skyrocketed under Putin's "central
authority." Renationalization and redistribution of property
directed by Putin's autocratic regime have caused declines in
the performance of formerly private companies, destroyed value
in Russia's most pro?table companies, and slowed investment,
both foreign and domestic. Investment in Russia, at 18 percent
of GDP, is stronger today than ever before, but well below the
average for democracies in the region, such as Poland and Estonia.
Perhaps the
most telling evidence of Putin's personal impact on Russian
growth is provided by regional comparisons. Between
1999 and 2006, Russia ranked ninth out of the 15 post-Soviet
countries in terms of average growth. In 2006, the Russian economy
outperformed only Moldova's and Kyrgyzstan's. That's leadership?
Time's claim, therefore, that Putin has provided a "grand
bargain" of more growth for less freedom is indeed a "subjective
one," based on "no measuring stick or algorithm."
Comparing
Russia with Ukraine especially underscores the fallacy. Russia
and Ukraine share hundreds of years of culture and history
and endured the hardships of the 1990s. But today the two countries
have two big differences: Russia has oil and gas, and Ukraine
does not; Russia is an autocracy, Ukraine is not. Yet, despite
these differences, democratic Ukraine has managed annual growth
rates higher than autocratic Russia's, despite having to pay
dearly for—rather than reaping profits from—higher
energy prices. So, why was the erosion of democracy necessary
for economic growth? How did taking control of Russia's independent
TV stations help to balance the budget? How did arresting Garry
Kasparov earlier this month foster investment? One can only wonder
how much faster Russia would have grown with a more democratic
system, complete with an independent media to expose corruption,
a genuine courts system to prosecute illegal seizures of property,
and a real opposition to check the Kremlin's predatory behavior.
In mistaking
correlation for causation—in arguing that
the coincidence of Putin's time in power and Russia's economic
recovery proves that "individuals can make a difference
to history"—Time has delivered a public relations
coup to Putin. Kremlin officials have already applauded. For
those in Russia still fighting for independent media and still
convinced that objective journalism is a noble aspiration, Time's
decision to celebrate Putin with this un-honor most certainly
doesn't "feel right," and it most certainly doesn't
feel like journalism. Some traditions should come to an end.
Michael
McFaul is the Director of the Center on Democracy,
Development, and Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Freeman Spogli Institute
(FSI)
for International Studies, Stanford University (mcfaul@stanford.edu).
Petroleumworld does not necessarily
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Editor's
note: This commentary was originally published by Slate,
a daily magazine on the Web, from The Washington Post,
on 12/26/2007. Petroleumworld reprint this article in the interest
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Petroleumworld
News 12/27/07
Copyright© 2007
Michael McFaul. All rights reserved.
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