Lagniappe
The
Economist:
On PDVSA
The Economist magazine (suscribers only) has an interesting article
on national oil companies and how they serve as cash cows for governments.
Here are excerpts of article that relate to PDVSA.
"EXXON
MOBIL is the world's most valuable listed company, with a market capitalisation
of $412 billion. But if you compare oil companies by how much they have
left in the ground, the American giant ranks a lowly fourteenth. All
13 of the oil firms that outshadow it are national oil companies (NOCs):
partially or wholly state-owned firms through which governments retain
the profits from oil production. Because these national champions control
as much as 90% of the world's oil and gas, they can do far more than
the likes of Exxon to assuage the current worries about supply and to
influence the accompanying record prices. But like most state-owned
firms, they are prone to over-staffing, underinvestment, political interference
and corruption.
Petroleos
de Venezuela (PDVSA),
one of the biggest,
provides a cautionary tale of how bad they can be. Venezuela has exported
oil since the 16th century, when the mother of the Hapsburg emperor,
Charles V, had some shipped to Spain to treat his crippling gout. Big
multinationals, such as Royal Dutch Shell, set up shop in Venezuela
almost a century ago. By the 1930s the country was the world's second-biggest
oil producer. Today it remains one of the main sources of American oil
imports. There is also huge potential to expand production: if you include
its near-endless supply of treacly "ultra-heavy" oil, Venezuela
has the world's biggest reserves.
Like
many developing countries, Venezuela nationalised its oil industry in
the 1970s. But its politicians were mindful of the extravagant mess
that Pemex, Latin America 's biggest NOC at the time, had made of Mexico's
oilfields since the 1930s. So the Venezuelans devised a structure to
minimise the disruption. Former foreign concessions became free-standing
divisions of PDVSA, with many of their existing managers left in place.
From
these sensible beginnings, PDVSA developed a reputation for professionalism
and competence, matched by few other NOCs. The company was thought to
be relatively free from the corruption and cronyism that had spread
through Venezuela, fuelled by oil wealth. It was certainly efficient,
producing as much oil as Pemex did with a third of the staff.
In
the 1990s the Venezuelan oil company embarked on a scheme to raise output
to 6.5m barrels per day (b/d). This would be done by increasing its
own production and farming out marginal fields to foreign firms. The
idea, says Luis Giusti, who ran PDVSA from 1994 to 1999, was to make
use of multinationals' technology and capital without surrendering the
most lucrative opportunities to them.
By
1998 some 36 foreign firms had set up shop and were rapidly expanding
their output. PDVSA, meanwhile, had already reached 2.9m b/d and was
seeking the government's blessing to invest more to increase its production
capacity. But royalties were falling along with the oil price. With
an election looming, the government slashed the company's investment
budget instead. Output promptly started to fall and has never recovered.
Partly
because of geology and partly because of their age, Venezuela 's fields
require a lot of maintenance. The oil they produce is more viscous and
acidic than the norm, and so harder to handle. Less than a tenth of
the fields simply spout oil thanks to the natural pressure of the reservoir.
Keeping the remainder flowing requires constant injections of water
or gas. Even so, their output declines at roughly twice the pace of
oilfields in the North Sea. Venezuela has to add 400,000 b/d of new
annual production capacity just to keep output stable, according to
Mazhar al-Shereidah, an academic.
That
is even more expensive than it sounds, because each well produces only
a small amount: perhaps 180 b/d, compared with as much as 7,000 b/d
from some Persian Gulf wells. It takes Venezuela ten times more wells
than Saudi Arabia to produce a third of the oil. No wonder that at the
height of its expansion in 1997, PDVSA was investing $5.4 billion, according
to Wood Mackenzie, a consultancy.
But
when President Hugo Chavez came to power in 1999, he started squeezing
even more money out of the firm. By 2000 investment had fallen to $2.5
billion. Mr Chavez accused PDVSA of hiding its profits from the government
through deceptive accounting. He also questioned the firm's expansion
plans and overseas acquisitions. Above all, he decried its relative
autonomy and appointed a number of hostile bosses to impose his authority.
PDVSA's
management, naturally, resented this. They joined a general strike in
December 2002, along with half of the firm's 40,000 employees. Most
of the skilled staff, including engineers and technicians, stopped work
for two months. Since like patients in intensive care many of PDVSA's
wells require constant monitoring and treatment, says Mr al-Shereidah,
the strike killed lots of them. Analysts estimated that Venezuela lost
as much as 400,000 b/d of production capacity for ever, not to mention
billions of dollars in revenue.
But
the worst was still to come. Mr Chavez denounced the strikers as saboteurs
and sacked them all. The toll was highest among skilled workers: two-thirds
of managers and technical staff went. At a stroke, PDVSA lost almost
all of its most experienced and best-qualified employees, with an irreplaceable
understanding of the idiosyncrasies of its wells and fields.
Critics
say that the government restaffed the firm with incompetent cronies
and placemen. Contractors whisper that it is having trouble spending
even its reduced investment budget. Bids take months longer than necessary
to complete, one contractor complains, because the procurement staff
cannot get their technical specifications straight. Others point to
an increase in fatal accidents and fires at PDVSA's refineries as proof
that its workers are no longer up to snuff.
Staffing
has certainly become more political. Mr Chavez's cousin, Asdrubal, runs
the firm's shipping arm. The president's brother, Adan, helps to co-ordinate
the company's subsidised oil sales around the Caribbean as ambassador
to Cuba . Those who signed a petition advocating a recall election for
Mr Chavez complain that they cannot get jobs at PDVSA or its contractors.
Politics
has begun to intrude into the firm's strategy, too. Mr Chavez wants
PDVSA to do less business in the United States and more in Latin America.
In the name of regional integration, he is pushing for an expensive
natural-gas pipeline from Venezuela to Brazil , which would "bring
gas that does not exist to markets that do not exist", in Mr Giusti's
view. In theory, the hugoducto, as the pipeline is sarcastically known,
will be a money-making venture, but Mr Chavez has also dragooned the
company into all manner of charitable works. He insists that the firm
spend a tenth of its investment budget on social programmes, and has
pledged its help, in the form both of cheap oil and technological assistance,
to allies from Argentina to the Bahamas.
Clearly,
Venezuela's oil company no longer operates at arm's length from the
government. Its head, Rafael Ramirez, is also the Minister of Energy
and Oil. "The president tells PDVSA to commit suicide, and he says,
'Yes sir!'" gripes Elie Habalian, a former Venezuelan representative
at OPEC, with a mock salute.
The
company is also becoming more secretive. It has de-registered its refining
subsidiary, Citgo, at America's Securities and Exchange Commission,
and so no longer files any public reports to the organisation. In Venezuela,
the Ministry of Energy and Oil has only just released the 2003 edition
of its annual statistical compendium on the company's performance. Its
finances are certainly getting murkier: it now transfers much of its
earnings directly to a development fund controlled by Mr Chavez, rather
than sending them all to the central bank as it used to.
Despite
these worrying trends, the government claims that PDVSA has fully recovered
from the strike and sackings, and is now producing more than it did
beforehand. Officially, it is still planning to raise output to almost
4m b/d by 2012. But observers scoff at such notions. The company can
no longer maintain its own fields, let alone complete the many new projects
it is pursuing, says Diego Gonzalez, who used to work for its gas division.
Wood Mackenzie estimates that output slumped to less than 1.2m b/d in
2003. It subsequently recovered a bit, to 1.6m b/d, but is now falling
again.
These
failings have not stopped Mr Chavez from forcing most foreign oil firms
in Venezuela to go into partnership with its national champion. It is
now running the resulting joint ventures presumably no better than it
runs its original fields. Other countries go further: Saudi Aramco,
for one, has a monopoly on oil production in Saudi Arabia. PFCEnergy,
a consultancy, calculates that 77% of the world's oil and gas is found
in countries whose production is controlled by state-owned oil firms
and their partners."
The
Economist is one of world's most
read magazine on its topic.
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Editor's
Note: The Economist's excerpt was originally published in The Economist,
on 08/10/2006. Petroleumworld reprint this article in the interest of
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Petroleumworld
08/18/06
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