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Colombia:
Moving Forward with the ELN?
By
The International Crisis Group
Overview
A three-year peace process between the government of Alvaro
Uribe and the left-wing National Liberation Army (ELN) is at
a standstill, with concern rising that it is doomed by mutual
recalcitrance. The insurgent group, while much smaller than
the more prominent (and notorious) Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC), is probably both militarily stronger than
the government believes and politically weaker than its leaders
think. To counteract the spread of frustration and prevent
failure, the government and the rebels should immediately explore
creative options, as much to begin to establish some badly
needed mutual confidence as to tackle the persistent procedural
and substantive bottlenecks.
The peace
process has moved from an exploratory phase with intermittent
Mexican facilitation toward formal dialogue with
the accompaniment of Norway, Spain and Switzerland. Although
it is important that it has not broken down, eight rounds of
talks, from the formal December 2005 start in Havana, have
produced no tangible results. Some observers, citing the more
serious threat that the FARC represents and the growth of new
illegal armed groups, even assert that the ELN negotiation
is a sideshow of little relevance. Nevertheless, while the
ELN’s military capability has clearly been reduced by
Uribe’s tough security policy, the movement has survived
by staying mobile and adapting to local conflict conditions.
A ceasefire
is the first hurdle. There is agreement in principle on a
bilateral, “experimental” (i.e. temporary)
one, during which further negotiations would take place, but
disagreement on the concentration of rebel fighters, verification
of the accord and the government’s demand for a complete
end to kidnappings. The government wants the ELN to concentrate
its forces in specific locations and identify its combatants,
while the ELN wants to be able to stay mobile within specified
corridors. The basic disagreement over the type of ceasefire
has prevented the parties from defining the international mission
needed for verification. With no movement on a ceasefire, unilateral
humanitarian measures have been suggested as a possible way
to unblock the process. Both sides agree that de-mining and
a halt to kidnapping could be important steps toward peace
but questions remain as to the viability of undertaking these
actions outside the framework of a ceasefire, and it is doubtful
that humanitarian measures alone would overcome the more substantive
bottlenecks.
The ELN
and the government also differ on such fundamental matters
as the origins of the Colombian conflict and whether
simple reforms or deep structural changes are needed to resolve
it. The insurgents demand a National Convention with civil
society participation but have yet to offer clarity on how
such a body might actually produce the transformation they
insist upon. Political and socio-economic issues have been
broached in Havana but drafting of even an agenda for a political
negotiation has been postponed to an indefinite subsequent
stage. The ELN’s bottom line and what the government
would be prepared to offer in an endgame remain unclear.
Judicial guarantees for the ELN leaders will eventually be
another key issue. While the government has said it will apply
the Justice and Peace Law (JPL) to all illegal armed groups,
and the ELN has not ruled out assuming responsibility for its
actions, the insurgents have also called for an amnesty in
exchange for agreeing to a truth commission that would be charged
with establishing the responsibility of all actors in the armed
conflict, including the government. However, most ELN leaders
are accused of atrocities which would be difficult to excuse
with an amnesty consistent with international humanitarian
law and without creating new pressures for more lenient treatment
of demobilised and imprisoned paramilitary leaders.
Both sides, with the support of the three accompanying European
countries, need to explore ways to restore momentum in the
negotiating process, including unilateral measures aimed at
establishing a degree of mutual trust. Specifically:
the ELN should release its kidnap victims and de-mine some
areas;
the Uribe administration should seek a ceasefire as an important
step in the process rather than insist on an immediate and
complete cessation of all hostilities, and should show more
flexibility in addressing ELN concerns about concentrating
and identifying its fighters; and
Norway, Spain and Switzerland should consider offering international
experience with lessons learned on implementation of ceasefires,
temporary concentrations of fighters, protected corridors,
the importance of full involvement of civil society and local
communities, and verification by third parties.
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The
International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent,
non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 145
staff members on five continents, working through field-based
analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve
deadly conflict. Petroleumworld
not necessarily share these views.
Editor's
note: This
commentary was originally published by The Crisis
Group, on its Latin America
Briefing N°16, 11 October 2007. Petroleumworld
reprint this article in the interest of our readers.
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