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Sunday´s
Opinion
The
Russian-Iranian Energy Relationship
By
Florence C Fee
Are
Russia and Iran, with 20% and nearly 50% of the globe’s
proven oil and gas reserves, likely to develop a policy of coordination
of production and exports, potentially influencing global prices
and/or supply, to the detriment of energy consumers? In a world
where energy importing countries are newly concerned about security
of global supply, this has become a legitimate question.
This
author would argue that if one examines past history, current
Russian and Iranian national interests, and the complexities surrounding
their modern bilateral relations, it is difficult to envision
Russia and Iran being inclined, or even able, to create an alliance
to coordinate their oil and gas output and exports.
It
is fundamental to remember that Russia and Iran have long been
historical rivals. For both the Soviet Union and successor state
Russia, Persian-Muslim Iran was neither a client state nor a close
ally. The consequences of this competitive historical relationship
can still be felt today. And while both countries have, since
1991, forged solid, growing, state-to-state relations, and in
some cases relations of mutual dependency, their overall energy
relationship is marked by competition, friction, and ambiguity.
Further, relations are mainly regionally focused, centered on
the Caucasus/Caspian Sea and Middle East areas and include some
very divergent market positions. A main feature of Moscow’s
interactions with Iran have been to further advance Russian interests
in these two geographic areas which Iran straddles, the Caspian
Sea and Middle East.
Reserves
The
possibility of a coordinated energy policy by both states has
been occasioned by growing international awareness of the enormous
hydrocarbon reserves of both states, the fact those reserves are
firmly under state control, and the willingness of both states
to affect energy policy for wider geopolitical purposes.
Russia
and Iran control about 20% and 47% of the world’s oil and
gas reserves. Conservative estimates are that Russia today holds
48 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of natural gas reserves, or nearly
30% of the world’s total. This excludes the huge upside
gas exploration/development potential of Russia’s Northern
and Arctic Seas and continental shelf. As regards oil, Russia
holds 75bn barrels or approximately 8% of world oil reserves.
Again, exclusive of yet-to-be-discovered oil reserves in the vast
prospective onshore East Siberia region nor offshore in the north
and Far East. Iran holds 27 tcm of gas reserves, or about 17%
of the world aggregate and possesses 138bn barrels of oil or 12%
of world’s total. Given this undeniable reserves base, one
may ask what does each state hope to achieve in their energy policies?
Russian
State Interests
As
the international affairs maxim goes, nations do not have “friends,”
they have “interests.” Russia’s national interests
in the energy sphere, as they relate to Iran, are to:
Secure
export outlets for expanding Russian oil and gas volumes, including
developing a predominant globally-competitive LNG industry;
Monitor
OPEC, of which Iran is a member, to prevent adverse impacts of
its decisions on Russian exports and maintain price stability;
Secure
the Turkish and southeast Europe gas market, from Iran among others;
Persuade
Iran to join the Russian position on Caspian Sea demarcation and
common access to its surface waters;
Protect
a lucrative export arms and nuclear technology market, including
to Iran;
Ensure
Russian firms participate more broadly in Iranian upstream oil/gas
plays and other energy ventures;
Cooperate
with Shi?a Iran to halt the flow of Sunni Wahhabi Islamic fundamentalism
into Russia;
Partner
with Iran to promote a longer-term Asia-to-Europe trade and transportation
corridor to rival the Suez Canal.
Iranian
State Interests
Iran’s
State interests, as they relate to Russia and energy, are to:
Expand
its oil and gas production capacity and develop its offshore gasfields,
including monetizing the huge South Pars field in the Gulf, so
as to not lose market share to Russia and other non-OPEC producers;
Access
foreign capital and advanced (ie US/European, not Russian) upstream
oil and gas technology;
Develop
export gas markets regionally and internationally, including developing
a new LNG industry;
Promote
new gas pipeline markets such as Turkey, the Balkans and central-east
Europe;
Satisfy
domestic energy demand for its mostly young 67mn population living
predominantly in northern Iran;
Secure
a larger share of the Caspian Sea oil and gas reserves and counter
Russian hegemony of the Caspian surface waters;
Become
a major oil and gas transit route between the Caspian countries
of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Asia-Pacific consuming
nations.
Indeed,
the Russian-Iranian energy relationship is evolving into more
and more points of competition, overlap and intersection. This
trend has been encouraged under the Russian strategically-focused,
geopolitically assertive presidency of Vladimir Putin. But it
remains ad hoc and self-interested on Moscow’s part. Ironically
the growing interaction in some areas has also been furthered
by the indirect influence of the U.S. sanctions policy towards
Iran. Closely analyzing these State interests reveals the complexity
of the bilateral relationship.
Export
Outlets
Russia
is the world’s largest gas producer and exporter and second
largest oil producer. It relies on energy exports for two-thirds
of its export revenues. With oil prices up by $40/B from four
years ago, sustained by strong global and Asian energy demand,
energy resource holders naturally aim to produce and export to
the maximum to win market share and take advantage of high prices.
For Russia this is a special priority and challenge given: (a)
its massive size within two continents Europe, and Asia, plus
the Arctic, (b) the fact that its energy export transportation
systems are transitioning from the Soviet/Comecon era to present
Russia and newly independent neighbors, (c) recent problems with
Russian export transit states, and (d) the fact that its national
economy is hugely dependent on export oil and gas revenues making
energy outlets all the more important. The Russian goal has become
building and increasing the capacity of as many export outlets,
on its territory, as possible. Such export “outlets”
can encompass export infrastructure such as pipelines, crude and
product terminals, LNG liquefaction and regasification plants
and LNG tankers, river barges, ice-breaking tankers, etc, as well
as swaps since, in the absence of pipelines, swaps can result
in increased exports to world markets. For Russia it is vital
to have as many export outlets under its control and operating
at maximum capacity in order to defend important existing markets
such as Europe and create new exports markets in Asia and the
US.
It
is now a cornerstone of Kremlin energy policy that Russian energy
resources must be exported across Russian territory, via Russian
ports and terminals, using Russian State-controlled infrastructure
such as pipelines, railways, distribution grids, etc. Russia was
leaning in this direction but recent pricing and security disputes
with transit states Ukraine and Belarus have cemented the policy.
Significantly for Caspian producers, Russia does not view Iran
as a transit country for the export of Russian oil or gas to the
Gulf. Though for many Western oil firms, this export option would
make eminent technical and commercial sense.
Rather,
Moscow has given the highest priority to boosting its own export
capacity, first doubling, now further expanding, the Baltic Pipeline
System throughput, completing the Blue Stream export gas pipeline
to Turkey, expanding the Russian Atyrau-Samara pipeline carrying
Kazakh crude into and through Russia, promoting the Nord Stream
gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea from Russia direct to Germany,
and fast-tracking the Eastern Siberian-Pacific Ocean export oil
and gas lines to China and Asia markets.
Despite
this priority, in the past year Russia has failed to realize new
export outlets in its territory leading to a slowdown in its crude
production and export growth. The output slowdown may have been
due not only to limitations on export capacities, but also depletion
of fields currently in production. Nonetheless, this has occurred
while neighboring producers Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, with the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), Shah-Deniz, and Atasu-Alashankou export
pipelines, have opened new Caspian export outlets to Europe and
Asia. While Russia will undoubtedly participate in exporting Russian
volumes through Atasu-Alashankou, the BTC and Shah-Deniz outlets,
bypassing Russia and Iran, represent geopolitical and commercial
setbacks for both states.
As
regards Russian-Iranian cooperation over Caspian-Gulf oil swaps,
this trade, originally pursued by Russian firm Lukoil, which never
reached a substantial volume, has now been largely supplanted
by Kazakh/Turkmen-Iranian swaps. Seeking to become an important
transit route between the Caspian and Asia Pacific, Iran has recently
expanded its oil facilities at its Caspian port of Neka and by
October 2006, Kazakh and Turkmen crude shipments through Neka
averaged 136,000. The Neka volumes move via pipeline to the Tehran
and Tabriz oil refineries in northern Iran, with the Kazakh and
Turkmen producers receiving equivalent volumes of Iranian light
crude at Kharg Island in the Gulf for onward delivery to Asia-Pacific
and Europe.
OPEC
Both
Russia and Iran are major global oil producers and exporters but
as regards OPEC, they hold divergent positions. Russian oil production
in early 2007 stood at 9.5mn b/d of which about 4mn b/d are exported.
Iran hopes to bring its 4mn b/d oil production to a production
capacity (if not outright production) of 5mn b/d by 2008.
While
Russia and Iran compete in crude exports as discussed above, both
agree on the need for stable world oil prices. Iran is a member
of OPEC, and Russia is not, nor does it intend to join any time
soon. As a non-member observer, Russia has the best of both worlds:
unconstrained by oil export quotas, and is the beneficiary of
the price stability OPEC quotas provide. At the same time, Russia
seeks to maintain good relations with OPEC as the ultimate guarantor
of oil price stability. This is as true for gas as it is for oil
as gas prices generally lag behind oil prices by about 6 months.
And with Russia being the world’s largest exporter of natural
gas gives it another incentive to support, if not join, OPEC.
As
an OPEC member, Iran is bound with adherence to its output quotas,
while also facing the imperative need to increase its own production
rates not only for urgent economic reasons, but also for technical
reasons. Iran is concerned to speed the development of its so-called
“shared” reservoirs or fields, ie oil and gas bearing
structures in borderland areas. These include three major fields:
South Pars/Northern (Iran/Qatar), Azadegan/Majnoon (Iran/Iraq)
and Anaran (Iran/Iraq). Near-term production by contiguous states
could harm Iran’s eventual output levels from those fields.
Further hampering development has been the fact that some fields,
ie Azadegan, are strewn with landmines from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq
war.
For
Iran and other OPEC producers, Russia is not yet a threat to their
strategy. However should Russian crude export volumes substantially
increase, this will bring Russia and Iran more and more into competition
as the latter struggles to meet domestic demand and pushes back
against the loss of export markets to non-OPEC producers like
Russia.
As
regards the potential for a gas “opec,” whatever Iran’s
stated position, it is highly unlikely that Russia, the dominant
producer of the two, would agree to such a cartel. For Moscow,
state control over export policy is primary; agreeing to cede
some of its control, by coordinating output or export policy with
another state or states, would appear antithetical to current
policy.
Turkish
And Balkan Markets
This
is a market where Russia and Iran are in current competition,
with Russia defending its position and Iran seeking new markets.
Russian gas exports to Turkey are via three pipeline systems:
Transbalkan I, Transbalkan II, and Blue Stream. Turkey is demanding
price concessions for Russian gas having overestimated its domestic
gas demand. Further, the now operational Shah-Deniz gas pipeline
from Azerbaijan, traversing Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, is
delivering Azeri gas into Turkey. Iran would like to compete with
Russia on gas exports not only to Turkey, but also to Bulgaria,
Romania and Greece and further west in Europe (see Nabucco below).
This is not a market Russia will easily cede to Iran.
The
proposed Nabucco gas pipeline project, for which Iran would be
a major gas supplier, has the potential to threaten Russia’s
hold over export routes from the Caspian and deliveries to southeast
Europe. It is being supported by the EU as one means to reduce
that bloc’s dependence on Russian energy supplies, a most
sensitive issue following Russia’s January 2006 disruption
of European gas deliveries over a dispute with Ukraine and a December
2006 crude supply disruption due to Belarus pricing issues. The
3,300km Nabucco pipeline would bring 25-30 bcm/yr of gas from
Azerbaijan and Iran to central Europe, bypassing Russia. The line
would run from Iran and the Caspian through Turkey to Bulgaria,
Romania, Hungary and Austria. Construction is expected to begin
in 2008.
Russia
will vigorously oppose this challenge to its control of Caspian
export outlets, as well as its dominance of the Turkish, Balkan
and east-central Europe gas markets. Russia has signed an agreement
with Nabucco-participant Hungary to explore constructing regional
transit routes in Hungary for supply to east-central Europe and
to consider extending the Bluestream pipeline from Russia to Turkey
then to Hungary and onward to Austria and Italy in an effort to
provide an alternative to the Nabucco pipeline. The progress in
advancing construction of the Burgas-Alexandropolis export oil
pipeline from Bulgaria to Greece, with partners Russia (51%),
Bulgaria and Greece, is yet another manifestation of Moscow’s
focus on the Balkan market and control of export outlets.
Caspian
Ownership/Security
Russia
and Iran continue to dispute legal ownership of the Caspian Sea
including subsea mineral rights. While Russia has been successful
in bringing two other Caspian littorals, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan,
around to its preferred median-line solution, it is finding it
difficult to win round Iran and Turkmenistan
Russia
has formally ruled the Caspian since 1828 when it gained full
control of the inland sea under the Treaty of Turkmenchaisk. After
the demise of imperial Russia in 1917, the Soviet Union granted
Iran limited control over a small part of the sea (13%) in the
Soviet-Iranian Treaties of 1921 and 1940. But with the break-up
of the FSU, and the creation of three newly independent Caspian
littoral states (Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan), Russia
has promoted a median-line solution equidistant from each state’s
coastline, with disputed fields to be developed jointly. As this
solution gives Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Russia the greatest
share of the Caspian, unsurprisingly, they are supporters of this
approach.
Iran
and Turkmenistan do not accept the median-line solution. Tehran
has consistently held out for an equal share Caspian solution
giving every littoral state a 20% sector, regardless of length
of coastline. This approach gives Iran a 7% share increase (versus
13%). As Caspian development projects have proceeded, it is clear
the northern Caspian basin is more prolific than the southern
basin. Thus Iran’s only hope of gaining a larger share of
Caspian wealth is by extending its sector size. Also developing
southern basin reserves offshore Iran will be more costly being
located in 600-800ms of water versus 10-50ms in the north Caspian.
Tehran continues to insist that all five littoral states must
agree demarcation before joint exploration-development projects
can proceed.
Paradoxically,
while Russia and Iran diverge on how the Caspian Sea should be
split, they are united in their opposition to Kazakhstan’s
plans to build a subsea trans-Caspian pipeline to ship Kazakh,
and potentially Turkmen and Uzbek, gas exports, to Europe. Both
oppose construction of pipelines across the Caspian seabed until
demarcation of the sea has been agreed among the littorals. They
are agreed that in having lost market share due to BTC and Shah-Deniz
transport systems, they are not eager to see additional bypass
outlets take shape in the Caspian.
Security
represents another contentious issue between Russia and Iran in
the Caspian Sea, particularly over control of surface waters.
This became an especially topical issue in 2006 when the Tengizchevroil
joint venture, the Eni-led consortium developing the Kashagan
field, and the Kazakh state oil firm, Kazmunaigaz, agreed to a
create an export system (KCTS – Kazakhstan Caspian Transport
System) to deliver Kazakh crude from Tengiz and Kashagan to the
BTC pipeline in Baku. This system would utilize an oil tanker
fleet plying the Caspian waters rather than a trans-Caspian pipeline
and would bypass both Russia and Iran (as do BTC and Shah-Deniz).
Arms
And Nuclear Technology
In
nuclear and military assistance, Iran has been a very profitable
market for Russia. For Iran, its dependence on Russian arms is
growing; it is now Russia’s third largest arms buyer. In
early 2007, Iran took delivery of sophisticated Russian Tor-M1
anti-aircraft missiles, a sale worth a reported $1bn-plus, for
defense against air attacks, including on Iranian nuclear facilities.
Since 1991 Russia has also sold Iran tanks and armored battle
vehicles both critical components for the Iranian army.
Russia
plans to undertake a $5bn project to build five nuclear reactors
in Iran. The US opposes those plans claiming the technology involved
is dual-purpose, useable for both civilian and military applications.
Iran defends its right to acquire “advanced nuclear technology”
for producing nuclear energy and has pledged to cooperate with
the IAEA. The Kremlin insists it has been assured by Tehran that
it has no plans to develop nuclear weapons and has agreed to sign
the IAEA Additional Protocol expanding international inspections
of its nuclear program. From Russia’s perspective, the IAEA
position and Iran’s interest in greater transparency in
its nuclear program open the way for greater Russian-Iranian nuclear
technology cooperation. In the Kremlin’s view however, such
an important revenue stream with Iran is not going to be sacrificed
to US wishes.
Iranian
Upstream
Russia
is not content with the level of Russian firms’ involvement
in the Iranian oil and gas upstream. Delays in rooting Russian
companies in Iran reflect not only Iranian problems implementing
the opening of its energy sector to foreign investors, but also
the fact that, for Tehran, Russian firms are not the preferred
operators. Iranians want to attract the most modern, sophisticated
oil and gas field technology available and in many cases that
comes from international energy firms.
Russian
upstream participation has so far included the Russian gas monopoly
Gazprom’s participation in the early phases of the huge
South Pars gasfield; Lukoil’s interest, with Norsk Hydro,
in the 2bn barrels Anaran block in western Iran next to the Iraq
border; and Rosneft and Zarubezhneft role in the massive Azadegan
oil field near the Iraqi border. In the past, the Russian pipeline
construction company, the Gazprom-related Stroitransgaz, had built
a major portion of one of Iran’s main gas trunk lines between
Asaluyeh on the Gulf coast to the Vali Asr gas processing plant
in the interior. Gazprom would also like to build Iran’s
subsea export gas pipeline to India. New Delhi has stated it will
not consider an onshore Iran-India gas pipeline that transits
Pakistan, for security reasons.
But
for the Russians, the South Pars field, with its estimated aggregate
cumulative production range of 13 tcm, a stunning one-half of
all Iran’s recoverable gas reserves, and 17bn barrels of
condensate, is the prize. Revenues are estimated to be $11bn/yr,
yielding total revenues of $700bn over the life of the field.
Gazprom has offered to build a pipeline from the project’s
landfall to an onshore oil field (Agha Jari) for gas reinjection.
Later development phases of South Pars are intended as feedstock
for producing and exporting LNG for European and Asian markets.
Expanding its holdings in the Iranian upstream remains a major
priority for Kremlin energy strategists, as well as helping “shape”
the nascent Iranian LNG industry to ensure it does not become
a threat to encroach on future Russian LNG markets in Europe and
Asia.
Muslim
Ties
An
area where Russia and Iran appear to be in close alignment is
the matter of Muslim ties, specifically the question of the export
of Islamic fundamentalism from Iran into Russia. Radical Shi'a
Islam is not an issue that divides Russia and Iran. Moreover,
by strengthening its cooperation with Islamic Iran, Moscow is
able to gain protective cover with its own 20mn Russian Sunni
Muslims. Russia has a legitimate concern regarding radical Islam
fomenting unrest or rebellion in its Volga and Caucasus Muslim
regions. However, it does not see Iran as representing such a
threat. Iran is Shi'a, and Russia sees the Sunni/Wahhabi form
of Islam as more dangerous and threatening. Sunni/Wahhabism emanates
from states such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, not Iran. There
are very few Shi'a Muslims in Russia as the main Shi'a group in
the FSU are Azeri Muslims who are of Turkic origin and largely
secular.
In
this regard at least, Iran’s foreign policy has evolved
from ideological goals to geopolitical interests best shown by
Tehran’s policy towards the Chechen conflict. After the
October 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis, the Iranian government’s
reaction was generally muted and supportive of Russia. This position
reflected not only relations with Moscow on Islam as described
above, but also Iranian realpolitik, as well as its dependence
Russian military and nuclear development assistance. But perhaps
paramount was Iran’s concern about the potentially destabilizing
effect of ethnic sentiments among its own minority populations.
Iran’s
respect for Russia’s territorial integrity reflects its
own problems with its ethnically diverse population. Iranian minorities
– Azeris in the northwest, Kurds in the west, Arabs in the
south, Baluchis in the southeast, and Turkmen in the northeast
– have at different times expressed separatist or autonomous
sentiments. The theocrats in Tehran fear that someday Iran, like
Russia, may confront a separatist rebellion in one of its provinces.
That point of commonality between Moscow and Tehran and its influence
on their relations cannot be overestimated.
Conclusions
Russian
and Iranian energy resources, given their size, both separately
and together, are important to future global energy supply. In
examining the potential for both coordinating their oil and gas
production and export policies, it is clear the likelihood of
that occurring is low, due to the nature of their bilateral relationship,
their multiple competing national interests, particularly over
new export oil/gas markets, and the ongoing impact of their historic
rivalry.
While
Iran and Russia do have strong, state-to-state ties across a wide
range of important energy-related issues, it is a complicated
relationship. Both consider themselves partners and allies in
some areas and are clear competitors in others. They appear willing
to resolve outstanding issues (Caspian demarcation); exhibit sensitivity
towards each other’s problems (restive or separatist minorities,
territorial integrity); have many points of mutual dependence
(stable oil/gas prices and markets, arms and nuclear technology
trade, opening new international trade routes); as well as having
points of competition (oil and gas exports, sharing Caspian resources,
securing regional gas markets; building new LNG industries). Both
do not now coordinate their export gas policies because inter
alia they are competing for similar markets and are both on the
cusp of developing their own LNG industries well beyond their
borders and even regions.
One
element influencing Russian-Iranian bilateral relations, if inadvertently,
is the US sanctions policy towards Iran which appears to be having
the consequence of moving Russia and Iran into closer cooperation.
Russia and Iran both seek to assert their independent foreign
policy as a counter to US policy. At the same time, US dependence
on imported gas is growing significantly and is the world’s
fastest-growing market for LNG. Given Moscow’s and Tehran’s
massive aggregate holdings in oil and gas reserves, and recognizing
the complexity and multi-dimensional nature of their bilateral
relations, as well as the low likelihood of their aligning export
production policies, it would seem prudent for energy importing
nations to view them, amongst other issues, in a strategic, long-term,
energy supply perspective.
Florence
C Fee
is a former executive with Chevron and Mobil, heads international
energy consultancy F C Fee International, Inc, specializing in
risk management in international upstream energy projects.Petroleumworld
not necessarily share these views.
Editor's
Note: This article was was written exclusively for Middle East
Economic Survey ( MEES), is a further development of an earlier
one by the author on "Russian and Iranian Gas and Future
US Energy Security" (MEES, 15 September 2003) - and was originally
publish in MEES, VOL.VOL. XLIX, No 11, 12-Mar-2007. Petroleumworld
reprint this article in the interest of our readers.
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