The
US’s Political Jiu Jitsu In The Middle East
TNR
By
Gary Sick
About six months ago, I wrote an article speculating on what
I thought was an emerging US Middle East strategy. The essence
of the argument was that the US would attempt to use the threat
of Iran and a Shi?a political emergence to mobilize Arab support
and perhaps even a degree of tacit Arab-Israeli cooperation.
The strategy would also intend to shift attention away from
the US catastrophe in Iraq. I was asked some weeks ago how
I (or the US, for that matter) could reconcile this tripartite
strategy focused on Iran as the enemy with the decision to initiate direct talks with Iran. I thought it
was a very good question, and I have been thinking about it.
I was finally moved to respond by the news that the US intends
to sell $20bn in new arms to the Arab states of the Gulf over
the next decade, while increasing military aid to Israel by
25% (a total of $3bn per year) and also raising aid to Egypt
by a smaller but significant amount. Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates are getting ready
for a major Middle East trip to present this package and to
attempt to forge a working consensus focused squarely on Iran
as the major threat in the region. The level of the bribes
may change in the course of discussions, but this is obviously
intended as an offer that they cannot refuse.
This strikes
me as a marvelous example of political jiu jitsu. The US
made possible an emergent Iran by eliminating its Taliban
rivals to the east and its Ba?thist rivals to the west and
then installing a Shi?a government in Baghdad for the first
time in history. Having inadvertently created a set of circumstances
that insured an increase in Iranian strength and bargaining
power, that seriously frightened the US’s erstwhile Sunni
allies in the region, and that undermined US strength and credibility,
the US now proposes a new and improved regional political relationship
to deal with the problem, and, incidentally, to distract attention
from America’s plight in Iraq while reviving America’s
position as the ultimate power in the region.
Potentially Huge Flaw
But there
is a potentially huge flaw in this brilliant policy legerdemain.
Iraq will just not go away, and the government
of Nuri al-Maliki, a Shi?a partisan, is proving to be an intractable
obstacle to sweeping the Iraqi debacle under the rug. The “surge” in
US military forces may be intended to create at least the illusion
of greater stability in Baghdad and thereby facilitate the
start of a US withdrawal. It may also provide the basis for
greater pressure on the Iraqi government to solve some of its
most pressing political and economic disputes. But it seems
to be a tactical maneuver that is unlikely to produce any long-term
solutions.
Perhaps
the same can be said about the talks with Iran. These serve
several purposes. First, they provide periodic opportunities
for the US to denounce Iran’s nefarious actions and thereby
reinforce the Iran-focused strategy. They also serve to placate
those in the UN Security Council and elsewhere who believe
that the sanctions policy should be accompanied by direct diplomacy.
They are a gesture in the direction of the Baker-Hamilton commission,
which called for the creation of a regional forum to deal with
Iraqi dilemma, and they provide evidence to American’s
Sunni Arab allies that Washington is prepared to go some way
to “tame” the Iranians. The talks may also serve
the purposes of the hardliners around Dick Cheney who want
to make them fail so they can point to the futility of talking
to fanatics. But they also respond to direct requests by the
Iraqi government to bring Iran into the security equation,
and they provide a forum in which Iran, Iraq and the US can
all three meet around the same table.
It is unclear
to me whether the US is serious about the talks, and perhaps
Washington itself has not fully made up its mind.
But I am more than a little surprised that Iran has shown a
willingness to proceed with them, and even to make them a regular
fixture, despite US disparaging comments and sermonizing at
every possible opportunity. Iran's response has been remarkably
imperturbable. Is Tehran willing to accept US bluster addressed
to its domestic constituents as a necessary evil in order to
obtain a desirable outcome? Do they know something I don’t
know? The bottom line in any event is that neither the US nor
Iran has walked away from the talks, although either of them
could have done so at any point. That suggests a degree of
seriousness that perhaps belies the hostile rhetoric.
In January,
I spelled out what I saw as the “moving
parts” of the new US strategy – a proposed division
of labor among the various parties. Perhaps this is a good
moment to review this checklist:
United States:
1. Drop any further talk about democratization in the Middle
East [done];
2. Use its influence in the UN Security Council to keep the
pressure on Iran (and to a lesser extent Syria) with sanctions
and coordinated international disapproval [done];
3. Provide
military cover for the Arab Gulf states as they take a more
confrontational position vis-à-vis Iran
(Patriot missiles, additional naval aircraft, etc) [now greatly
enhanced by the massive proposed arms deal, which of course
produces some juicy profits for the US aerospace industry but
also provides a framework for getting Israeli (and US congressional)
acquiescence for selling some significant new military technology
to the Arabs];
4. Undertake a more vigorous diplomatic effort to find a settlement
of the Arab-Israeli dispute, recognizing that even limited
visible progress will provide diplomatic cover for the Arab
states if they are to cooperate more closely with Israel [some
considerable efforts to date, including calls for a new peace
conference and other initiatives, though still far less than
most observers would regard as satisfactory];
5. In Lebanon, provide covert support for efforts to support
the Siniora government and to thwart Hezbollah, probably in
close cooperation with Israeli intelligence [being done?];
6. Organize dissident movements in Iran, primarily among ethnic
groups along the periphery or other targets of opportunity,
to distract and potentially even destabilize the Tehran government
[being done?].
Iraq:
1. Keep attention focused on Iran, including raids and general
harassment of its representatives [the 5 Iranians who were
arrested in Irbil have now been in US custody for more than
six months, during which time Iranian representatives have
been permitted to meet them only once, near the six-month anniversary];
2. Keep US forces in country to prevent the situation from
descending into full scale civil war or a break-up of the country
[done];
3. Consider engineering a more Sunni-friendly government,
especially if Prime Minister Maliki is unwilling or unable
to control the Shi?a militias [not yet].
GCC + Jordan and Egypt:
1. Provide major funding and political support to the Siniora
government in Lebanon and work to undercut Hezbollah's influence
and image [not clear to me];
2. Attempt to woo (or threaten) Syria away from its alliance
with Iran with promises of money and support of Syrian efforts
to regain the Golan Heights [if so, the effort is totally subterranean
as far as I can tell];
3. Provide
facilities and funding to assist the various U.S. initiatives
above [not really; Saudi Arabia has brokered its
own deal with Hamas against US and Israeli wishes, and it has
done some direct diplomacy with Iran to try and find a more
acceptable modus vivendi, which seemed to produce some positive
results – in short, the Sunni Arabs have not been particularly
active in holding to their end of the bargain as I see it];
4. Attempt to bring down the price of oil, which will remove
some political pressures on Washington and make life more difficult
for Iran [again, no very persuasive cooperation from the Arab
side].
Israel:
1. Provide intelligence support to US (and potentially Arab)
anti-Hizbollah efforts in Lebanon [probably done];
2. Keep international attention focused on the Iranian threat
as a uniquely dangerous situation that may even demand Israeli
military intervention [done in spades; please note that on
the very day that word was leaked of the new US arms deal,
the pro-Israeli website DEBKA announced that Iran was buying
a huge number of long range attack aircraft and refueling aircraft
from Russia, thus hyping the threat - whether true or not -
and providing an allegedly genuine threat rationale for the
massive arms deal];
3. Use long-standing Israeli contacts, especially with the
Kurds in Iraq and Iran, to foment opposition to the Tehran
government [being done? needless to say, nobody will make an
announcement];
4. Be prepared to make sufficient concessions on the Palestinian
issue and the Golan to provide at least the perception of significant
forward motion toward a comprehensive settlement [not apparent
to me, but that's not my field and I may not catch the subtle
shifts, if any].
I realize that I am not doing justice to many of the moving
parts in this alleged strategy. However, the existence of such
a US strategy seems to me indisputable, and the biggest question
marks about its success involve (1) Arab (read Saudi) policy
idiosyncrasies and doubts that don't fit with the American
plan; (2) the internecine labyrinth of Iraqi politics and security;
and perhaps (3) Iranian policy that has the capacity to surprise.
On one hand, Iran is performing according to plan, with Ahmadinejad
continuing with his extravagant rhetoric and the Iranian security
services holding American-Iranian scholars hostage in Evin
prison and concocting TV KGB-style “confessions” that
would be hilarious if they were not so grim in purpose and
so painful for those involved.
But Iran
also seems to have made a fundamental decision to talk to
the US, and that is an interesting development that
deserves to be acknowledged. This suggests that there are at
least some power centers in Iran that are still operating on
a pragmatic basis, at the same time that the security paranoia
of the intelligence and “Justice” ministries has
seemingly spiraled out of control.
Finally, much of the criticism of my earlier speculation consisted
of doubts that the Bush administration could possibly be capable
of constructing such a complex strategy. I am aware of the
total incompetence of this administration over much of the
past five years or so in the Middle East, and I also read the
polls saying that their confidence level with the American
people (not to mention the rest of the world) is at a nadir.
However, I am simply describing what I see, and I think it
is important to take seriously the evidence in front of us.
Perhaps my analysis is wrong, but I don't believe this concatenation
of actions by the Bush administration is simply random.
Gary
Sick served on the National Security Council staff under
Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan. He was the principal
White House aide for Iran during the Iranian Revolution and
the hostage crisis and is the author of two books on US-Iranian
relations. He is the executive director of Gulf/2000, an
international research project on political, economic and
security developments in the Gulf, conducted at Columbia
University with support from a number of major foundations.
He wrote the following for Gulf/2000 members on 29 July. Petroleumworld
not necessarily share these views.
Editor's
Note: This article was written for Gulf/2000
members on 29 July, and first republished with
the author’s permission by Middle
East Economic Survey, VOL.
L, No
32, 6-August-2007. Petroleumworld
reprint this article in the interest of our readers.
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