Bolivia’s
controversial constitution
By
John Crabtree
The
approval of a constitution embedding new rights for Bolivia's
indigenous majority has opened new political battlelines, says
John Crabtree.
Bolivia's
ruling Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and its allies
anticipated the looming deadline for the rewriting of the country's
constitution - 14 December 2007 - by approving the new 411-article
constitutional draft on 8-9 December. The constituent assembly
in the city of Oruro approved the new text - sixteen months
since its inauguration on 6 August 2006, and in the absence
of the
main opposition party - in only sixteen hours. The new document,
which involves major institutional changes with respect to
the rights of Bolivia's indigenous peoples, will be put to
a referendum
in 2008. But Bolivia's opposition, encouraged by Hugo Chávez's
defeat in the Venezuelan referendum on 2 December 2007, is
promising a relentless fight to prevent it being ratified;
the battlelines
for a new contest between left and right are being drawn.
The government of Evo Morales and the MAS, voted into office on
a wave of public support in December 2005, had promised at the
outset to overhaul the constitution to give a bigger political
voice to Bolivia's indigenous majority. The constituent assembly,
in which the MAS won more than half the seats, began its deliberations
in August 2006 with an initial mandate of twelve months in which
to agree upon a draft constitution, with a referendum scheduled
to follow.
The lengthy delays in achieving agreement on procedural issues
- particularly the majority with which new articles to the constitution
would be approved - meant that the deadline for completing the
draft text had to be postponed from 6 August to 14 December 2007.
The opposition parties demanded that each and every article would
have to be approved by a two-thirds majority; since they held more
than a third of the seats, they knew that this would give them
an effective veto.
A compromise agreement was eventually reached on this thorny issue.
A further delay was then caused by the insistence of the inhabitants
of Sucre, the colonial city where the assembly was being held,
that their town should regain its former status as Bolivia's full
capital. Sucre had been capital up until 1899, when it was relegated
to being the seat of the judiciary alone while the executive and
legislature moved to La Paz. Sucre's civic committee, infuriated
by the refusal of the assembly to consider this issue (and backed
in their attitude by the opposition) made it effectively impossible
for the assembly to convene.
The bull by the horns
In late November 2007, with the revised December deadline only
days away, the Morales government finally decided to seize the
initiative. It removed the plenary of the assembly to the more
secure environment of a military academy just outside Sucre. Here
it was surrounded by troops and MAS loyalists, provoking protests
from the main opposition parties, who boycotted the proceedings
and instead took to the streets. In the melee that ensued, four
people (three protestors and one police officer) were killed and
hundreds hurt. But with the opposition absent, the MAS and its
left-of-centre allies speedily approved an outline constitution
by an overwhelming majority.
The assembly members then found themselves unable to return in
safety to Sucre, and reconvened finally in the city of Oruro on
8 December to approve the new text item by item. The approved text
was - with some minor last-minute changes - that drawn up by the
MAS bloc in the assembly. Podemos, the main opposition party, again
absented itself (apart from a brief incursion to register its protest),
although the smaller Unidad Nacional (UN) did attend. The fact
that the number of delegates present from the MAS and its allies
was well in excess of the two-thirds required meant that the new
constitution was summarily approved with little debate on the substance
of the details.
The key provisions
The main provisions of the new constitutional text include:
* Bolivia
as a unitary but plurinational state. This provision is designed
to reaffirm the significance of ethnicity in the country's
make-up. In practice, however, it does not involve any major change;
the previous constitution also acknowledged Bolivia to be "multi-ethnic" and "plurinational"
* State
ownership of natural resources. This is designed to underpin
government policies to reaffirm state control over sectors like
oil and gas, privatised by previous governments. It would also
affect the mining industry, which the government wants to bring
under tighter state control
* Constitutional
approval. Once it has been approved by referendum,
the constitution will only need to be ratified by two-thirds of
those present, not two thirds of the elected members
* Changing
the composition of congress. The numbers in the chamber
of deputies will be reduced, while the number of senators will
be increased. All deputies are to be elected on a system of uninominal
constituencies, replacing the previous mixed system. A proposal
to scrap the senate (where the opposition has a majority) was abandoned
at the last moment
* A
mixed economy. This is designed to reassure business interests.
Ownership in the economy will be public, private and communitarian.
A referendum would be held prior to the constitutional referendum
on whether private land of up to 10,000 hectares will be allowed.
The 1953 agrarian reform, which limited landholding in the highlands,
was never applied in the lowland departments of Santa Cruz, Beni
and Pando
* Local
autonomies. The constitution will bring in a system of
territorial autonomies that involve a degree of decentralisation.
These will include not only departmental autonomies (one of the
principal demands of the opposition) but also municipal, regional
and indigenous autonomies. These would act as a check on the powers
of departmental governments, of which six out of nine are opposition-controlled
* Presidential
re-election. Elections would be held for public
office, including the presidency, once the new constitution is
finally approved. The existing bar on immediate re-election for
president and vice-president would be removed. Evo Morales's present
term would not be included, and he would therefore be able to stand
for office for two more successive terms (i.e. ten years). The
new constitution would introduce a second round in presidential
voting where no candidate reaches 50% of the vote, ending a system
by which the newly elected congress chooses the president in such
circumstances
* Recall
of electoral mandates. The new constitution would provide
mechanisms by which all elected officials (from the president downwards)
could have their terms revoked in certain circumstances. This would
include departmental prefects. These, elected only since 2005,
have become a strategic bastion for the opposition
* Reorganisation
of the judiciary. The indigenous systems of justice
would be given the same standing in the official hierarchy as the
existing system. The constitutional tribunal would have parity
representation between indigenous and non-indigenous members. Judges
would be elected, not appointed by congress as at present
* The
capital compromise. Sucre is to be acknowledged as Bolivia's
official capital, but the constitutional text does not mention
where the various institutions and powers will be based. The presupposition
here is that the executive and legislature will remain in La Paz,
while the judiciary continues to be based in Sucre. The electoral
authorities are to be upgraded to a fourth power, which will also
be located in Sucre.
The government's objectives
In pushing
for these changes, the Morales administration has always argued
that it was elected on a mandate to "refound" the
country's political institutions. It therefore sees its role as
bringing about "revolutionary" changes that will radically
alter the political system and make such changes permanent. A key
long-term objective has been to increase direct democracy and reduce
the barriers to participation for Bolivia's indigenous peoples
and strengthen their rights.
However, in seeking to implement its agenda and make it permanent,
the government is determined to reduce the spaces open to the opposition
parties and to re-engineer the political system to its own advantage.
An increase in the number of senate seats, for example, is designed
to end the opposition majority in the upper house, where the smaller
eastern departments are over-represented. The senate has acted
as a severe obstacle to the government's legislative agenda.
For their part,
the opposition parties claim that the government is bent on establishing
a one-party-dominated state that effectively
spells an end to pluralism. Opposition leaders, such as former
president Jorge Quiroga, have consistently argued that the government
in Bolivia is just following in Chávez's footsteps. They
accuse the Morales administration of seeking to monopolise power
indefinitely and, by entering into the Chávez orbit, drawing
the country into a dangerous confrontation with the United States.
The opposition dilemma
The opposition now vows to combat the government's constitutional
proposals with all the force it can muster. But it faces a dilemma
on how to proceed. The eastern departments - Santa Cruz in particular
- have announced the intention to declare their own de facto autonomy
from the government. Civic leaders in Santa Cruz claim that the
constitutional text is illegal and that they will not heed it.
Santa
Cruz has provided the basis for opposition to the Morales government
over the last two years, though prefects and civic committees
in several other departments have made common cause with it.
Santa
Cruz has been the main growth-pole in Bolivia in recent decades,
stimulated mainly by agribusiness and hydrocarbons. Civic leaders
there and other resource-rich departments argue that more of
the wealth these sectors generate should return to them. For
generations,
the assertive Comité Pro-Santa Cruz has demanded greater
autonomy from the central government in La Paz, even on occasion
threatening secession.
The row over the constitution apart, the government has infuriated
local prefects by threatening to apportion some of the rents these
receive to pay for a new national pensions scheme. The so-called
Renta Dignidad (dignity pension) would afford a monthly pension
to all those over the age of 60. This sort of universal entitlement
for the elderly is immensely popular in Bolivia, but the Renta
Dignidad also aims to cut the resources available to the prefects
from increased taxes on hydrocarbons. For the opposition, therefore,
the policy seems a cynical exercise by the government to win public
support at its expense.
However, other
more moderate voices may seek to challenge the government by
orchestrating a "no" vote in the referendum
on the constitution. In fact, there are two referenda planned.
The first will be on the issue of landownership in the lowlands
- itself a direct challenge to the wealthy landowners of Santa
Cruz and the Beni. This will take several months to organise. If
approved, it will then be subsumed into the constitution, and this
then will be put before voters in a second referendum. It therefore
seems unlikely that Bolivia's constitution will be definitely settled
much before the latter part of 2008.
The opposition
will hope that, as in Venezuela, the majority will in the end
vote "no". For his part, Morales will be counting
on his ability to maintain his popularity over this period. But
the conflicts over the constitution have done little to enhance
his government's reputation. And with inflation rising and real
incomes failing to keep up, the opposition parties will hope they
can broaden their support.
If the government's
calculation proves sound and the answer is "yes",
the electoral momentum would carry it through to a period of fresh
elections - probably in 2009 - for president, vice-president and
members of congress. Bolivia's struggle for power therefore promises
to be extended as well as bitter.
John
Crabtree is a research associate at Oxford University's Centre
for Latin American Studies. He is (on Bolivia) author of Patterns
of Protest: Politics and Social Movements in Bolivia (Latin America
Bureau, 2005) and co-editor of Unresolved Tensions: Bolivia Past
and Present (Pittsburgh University Press). Petroleumworld
not necessarily share these views.
Editor's note: This
commentary was originally published by Open Democracy Net,
on December 12, 2007.
Petroleumworld reprint this article in the interest of our readers.
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