Harassed
Opposition and Controlled Elections
Several regional leaders--including Organization of American
States (OAS) secretary general José Miguel Insulza--have
declared that it is not enough for a leader to be elected democratically
if he does not govern democratically. The case against Chávez
is fairly damning. International observers have found that the
voter lists and electoral apparatus are seriously flawed. And,
it is difficult to conceive that any future election conducted
under the current conditions by the partisan electoral apparatus
would “pass muster” with international observers.
While opposition candidates certainly face a popular Chávez,
they are further impeded by an electoral system largely controlled
by regime loyalists. A recent poll by Consultores 21 found that
less than half of Venezuelans thought the National Electoral
Council was impartial (46 versus 49 percent).[1] Said presidential
candidate Teodoro Petkoff, Chávez “has the entire
state apparatus at his service, and he uses it unscrupulously.”[2]
It
is indisputable that Chávez came to power--and has held
onto it--through elections with considerable popular support:
he was elected twice to the presidency and survived an August
2004 referendum that would have truncated his term in office.
The opposition has been unable to prove its claims of fraud
in the referendum balloting. However, in legislative elections
held in December 2005, despite Chávez’s urgent
appeals to the revolutionary fervor to consolidate his hold
on power, only around 10 to 15 percent of Venezuela’s
registered voters participated.
Opinion
polls show that most of Venezuela’s voters support Chávez
and consider him a committed democrat. However, Chávez
has surely learned from his tutor Fidel Castro that, although
a dictator might care about public opinion, the simple fact
is that he does not have to--particularly once he brings his
opposition under control. And, while he might concern himself
with the outcome of a given election, whether to even hold an
election is up to him.
Chávez
appears not to fear elections--in part because of his string
of victories (of decreasing transparency). He appears to have
made a cynical calculation that, as long as he conducts open
contests, he can blunt any criticism from abroad. He has spared
little effort to bring the electoral authorities of the nation
under his control, relying on his absolute control of the National
Assembly to change the composition of the National Electoral
Council. Today, not a single person identified with the opposition
serves on the council that oversees national elections.
Most
recently, Chávez responded to allegations of flawed democracy
in Venezuela by accusing the opposition of plotting to boycott
the December presidential elections so that they would not have
to recognize his inevitable victory. Should they do so, he threatens
to call a referendum to ask the public if they want him to serve
until 2031. Chávez has proven himself to be a shrewd
politician: he simultaneously allows a fairly vocal opposition
while spinning their cries for democracy into reasons to further
legitimize his control over the electorate. So, in essence,
Chávez has assured his movement of electoral victory--whether
the opposition chooses to compete or not.
Chávez’s
regime does not rely only on legal means to abuse its opponents.
Before and since the political crisis that led to his temporary
removal from power in April 2002, Chávez’s security
forces used indiscriminate and excessive force to put down political
demonstrators. His opponents have been subjected to extended
and unlawful detention and torture. Internationally respected
human rights organizations have documented in dramatic detail
cases in which Venezuelan security forces used excessive force
or caused the death of innocent bystanders.
A
nationwide network of so-called Bolivarian Circles (Círculos
Bolivarianos) and violent groups like the Tupamaros consisting
of armed thugs routinely attack Chávez’s political
opponents. Also, the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights has criticized the state for failing to prosecute hundreds
of cases of extrajudicial killings and for not investigating
“death squads” operating in the country.[3]
The
Judiciary in Chávez’s Hip Pocket
“Justice”
is meted out swiftly against opponents of the regime, while
a pattern of alleged abuses by government security forces goes
unpunished. In a 2004 report, Amnesty International issued an
extraordinarily damning declaration against what is supposed
to be a democratic government, saying, in part:
Over
recent years, these [Venezuelan] institutions have failed
to fulfill their constitutional role to act with equal impartiality
against government sup-porters and opponents accused of committing
crimes related to the ongoing political crisis. This lack
of impartiality, combined with long standing structural weaknesses
of these key institutions, threatens to strengthen the culture
of impunity that has accompanied human rights abuses over
many years in Venezuela.[4]
The
OAS’s commission has also accused the Venezuelan state
of repeatedly violating its international commitments by failing
to comply with decisions issued by the commission, thereby placing
“in peril the lives and personal integrity” of Venezuelan
citizens.[5]
Chávez
and his allies have worked assiduously to reconstitute the Supreme
Court and lower courts in order to ensure the political reliability
of the magistrates. The new rules established for the appointment,
renewal, and suspension of judges--by a simple majority of the
National Assembly--have had the effect of packing the courts
with judges known for their ideological loyalty to Chávez’s
political movement. The scrupulously impartial OAS Human Rights
Commission has asserted that these laws “appear to have
helped the executive manipulate the election of judges during
2004.”[6]
In
December 2004, Chávez loyalist Pedro Carreño,
head of the legislative commission nominating new judges, said
that not one of the nearly fifty appointees on that occasion
could be considered opposition figures. “We’re not
going to score a goal against ourselves,” he said.[7]
Omar Mora Díaz, the current head of the Supreme Court
of Justice, boasts of his commitment to armed struggle as a
teenager. Although he denies being associated with any political
movement, he declares himself a “revolutionary.”
The
OAS Human Rights Commission has complained bitterly that the
Chávez regime has failed to investigate and prosecute
accusations of politically related violence and murder. In fact,
the regime uses the investigatory powers of the state to harass
and persecute its opponents. One infamous example is that of
the political witch hunt conducted by Chavista prosecutor Danilo
Anderson, whose mandate was to ferret out those involved in
anti-Chávez activities. On November 18, 2004, Anderson
himself was murdered by a car bomb. While the regime has declared
him a hero of the revolution and used his murder to widen its
assault on its opponents, several have accused Anderson and
his team of extorting bribes from would-be targets.
As
a new presidential election season nears, the regime continues
to use its now well-practiced judicial team to target popular
opponents. Henrique Capriles Radonski, the thirty-three-year-old
popular mayor of Baruta, a middle-class neighborhood in Caracas,
was a target of Chávez’s judicial harassment under
the assassinated prosecutor Danilo Anderson. Just as the 2004
referendum process was under way, Capriles was charged for crimes
he allegedly committed two years earlier. On April 12, 2002,
during the period of Chávez’s brief ouster, anti-Chávez
protestors amassed outside of the Cuban embassy located in Baruta.
Fearful of violence, a European ambassador asked Capriles to
come to the site to quiet the crowd; he was admitted to the
embassy by the Cuban ambassador Germán Sánchez
Otero. Capriles urged the crowd to disperse, effectively ending
a siege of the diplomatic compound. Capriles was later charged
with trespassing, abusing his post, and violating international
principles for his actions at the Cuban embassy. He was jailed
for three months and then released in October 2004 after the
case was thrown out by appeals courts.8 Now that Chávez
has a stronger hold on the judiciary and is setting the stage
for the upcoming presidential elections, Capriles’s case
is back in court. He is set to go to trial on June 9.[9]
April
2002: The Coup d’État That Wasn’t
Most observers misunderstand the events of mid-April 2002 as
an attempted coup d’état against Chávez
instigated by his political opposition and abetted by a treacherous
military. What actually transpired was much more complicated.
On April 11, 2002, between 500,000 and 800,000 opposition demonstrators
were converging on the presidential compound in a political
demonstration that had been building after weeks of confrontation
in which the incendiary Chávez gave as good as he got.
Chávez, clearly angling for a decisive confrontation,
set off a chain of fateful events when he ordered his military
commanders to suppress raucous political demonstrations that
had surrounded Miraflores Palace. We see in retrospect that
this was not the act of a desperate political leader looking
to maintain order, but a logical, ruthless measure taken by
a man who cannot tolerate dissent.
Video evidence of the events shows Chávez’s civilian
henchmen emptying their pistols indiscriminately into the crowd
of protestors and Chávez’s determination to use
military force to crush his opponents. By invoking a long-standing
contingency plan for using military means to control the capital--dubbed
“Plan Avila”--Chávez miscalculated. Perhaps
recalling the admonition of Simon Bolivar that a soldier that
kills his own people is lost, one by one, unit commanders Major
General Manuel Rosendo and Major General Efrain Vásquez
Velasco appeared on live television broadcasts refusing to follow
the president’s orders. Military leaders would cite two
articles of Venezuela’s ¬constitution as justification--the
first forbidding the use of weapons of war against peaceful
demonstrators and the second stating that people should “disown
any regime, legislation or authority that violates democratic
values, principles or guarantees or encroaches upon human rights.”
Chávez
submitted and was detained by the military until he could be
flown to Cuba. The civilian leaders pressed into service as
interim leadership badly overreached, acting precipitously to
dismiss the congress, the courts, and all elected officials.
The military commanders had lost control of events. Major General
Vásquez Velasco demanded publicly that the interim government
retreat from its far-reaching measures. Before the civilian
leaders could react, the military leaders decided to restore
Chávez to power. Chávez was flown back to Miraflores
Palace aboard a military helicopter.
Three simple facts counter any claim that Chávez was
the victim of a traditional coup: First, the opposition suffered
many more casualties than did Chavistas, with the first victims
murdered by gunmen captured on amateur video. Second, Venezuela’s
Supreme Court and congress--after investigations conducted with
Chávez firmly restored to power--failed to charge a single
soldier for actions during the supposed coup. Third, Lucas Rincon--who
actually appeared on television to announce that Chávez
had agreed to resign--was subsequently named by Chávez
as minister of defense and as minister of the interior and justice.
NOTE:
Article 68 states that “citizens have the right to demonstrate,
peacefully and without weapons, subject only to such requirements
as may be established by law. The use of firearms and toxic
substances to control peaceful demonstrations is prohibited.
The activity of police and security corps in maintaining public
order shall be regulated by law.” Article 350 says, “The
people of Venezuela, true to their republican tradition and
their struggle for independence, peace and freedom, shall disown
any regime, legislation or authority that violates democratic
values, principles and guarantees or encroaches upon human rights.”
The latter has been interpreted by some (including the military
leaders) to be the constitutional right to rebellion. For a
non-official translation of the Venezuelan constitution in English,
see “Bolivarian Constitution,” Embassy of Venezuela
in the United States, available at www.embavenez-us.org/constitution/intro.htm.
Also
coming before the courts again is the case of María Corina
Machado, one of the founders and leaders of Súmate, a
Venezuelan nongovernmental organization (NGO) dedicated to promoting
democracy. Súmate has been meticulous in documenting
electoral tampering and has been vocal about its findings, making
it an obvious target. In February 2004, Chávez announced
the investigation into the financing of the group for accepting
funds from the U.S.-funded National Endowment for Democracy--which
Chávez asserts were used to destabilize his government.
Machado was charged with “conspiracy,” under the
penal code that stipulates that soliciting foreign intervention
in Venezuela’s domestic policy is subject to eight to
sixteen years in prison. The prosecution also has declared Súmate
to be a political party (which would make it explicitly illegal
for it to receive financial support from foreigners), even though
the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral or
CNE) does not recognize the group as a political party.[10]
Machado
also has been charged with treason on equally questionable grounds
for allegedly signing an anti-Chávez manifesto during
his April 2002 ouster. Machado explains that she never signed
such a document and that her signature was taken from the guest
registry of the presidential palace. In February 2006, the case
was dismissed and sent to another court after the European Union
ambassadors advised the government that they planned to attend
and monitor the court session.[11]
Media
under Assault
It
is true that opposition voices are heard regularly through the
media. However, since Chávez’s rise to power--in
which some media moguls actually supported him against the traditional
power structure--he has gradually eroded freedom of expression.
Using both legal measures and mob violence, his regime has harassed
media organizations and individual reporters to reduce the coverage
of dissident views and to produce self-censorship. Popular channels
have virtually eliminated their opinion and news programming,
and national reporters considered unfriendly to the regime have
been harassed, detained, and accused of baseless offenses.
Patricia
Poleo, a Venezuelan reporter who has earned international acclaim
for her investigative reporting, has been the subject of judicial
harassment since she embarrassed the Chávez regime by
revealing that Venezuelan security forces were harboring international
Peruvian fugitive Vladimiro Montesinos. She has been prosecuted
at least once and has been summoned to reveal the sources in
her investigation of the November 2004 assassination of Chavista
prosecutor Danilo Anderson. While Poleo asserts that the state
is trying to hide the truth behind the Anderson killing, the
regime has responded by accusing the reporter of masterminding
the car bombing.
In
December 2004, the National Assembly approved a media law that
international observers--including Human Rights Watch, Reporters
Without Borders, and the Inter-American Press Association--have
criticized as a tool to stifle freedom of expression. The OAS
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated, “The
use of vague terminology together with the existence of potentially
excessive penalties, could have the effect of intimidating the
media and journalists and, consequently, of curtailing the flow
of information about matters of public interest.”[12]
Undermining
Independent Labor Unions
Chávez
has even led an assault on the independent labor movement. In
December 2000, his government orchestrated elections of labor
leaders in which non-union members were allowed to cast ballots.
This transparent attempt to replace independent leaders with
Chavista loyalists was strongly rejected by the International
Labor Organization (ILO). Nevertheless, when elections were
finally held in October 2001, the non-Chavista slate was reelected,
although the regime has failed to accept these results.
Several
union leaders are now being pursued by the regime for their
role in the April 2002 events in which Chávez was removed
from power for forty-eight hours. National labor leader Carlos
Ortega was originally charged with “rebellion, sabotage,
and treason,” and he fled the country. After returning
from exile, Ortega was tried for “civil rebellion”
and “incitement to commit a crime” for his role
in an opposition-led national strike in 2002-2003. Ignoring
a ruling by the ILO in June 2004 that declared the strike a
legitimate exercise of workers’ rights, Ortega was convicted
and sentenced to nearly sixteen years in prison. He is in prison
today.
The
“Enemies List”
After
succeeding Richard Nixon as president, Gerald Ford is said to
have remarked, “A man who has to make a list of his enemies
has too many enemies.” In 2005, Chavista legislator Luis
Tascón revealed the existence of a list of over 3 million
Venezuelans who signed petitions in 2003 and 2004 calling for
a referendum on Chávez’s tenure. Tascón
published the list on his website prior to the August 2004 referendum.
Venezuelans
have complained of having been persecuted for daring to associate
with the opposition by signing a petition. Many on the infamous
list say they have lost government jobs or contracts. Others
have been refused basic public services, including passports.
Close to 150 people who signed the petitions have reported being
fired from their government jobs, and another 600 have complained
of harassment on the job.[13] Venezuelan minister of health
Roger Capela stated publicly that “a traitor cannot have
been in a position of responsibility, and this state has a policy
and a responsibility to the government in which there is not
space for a traitor . . . those that have signed are fired.”[14]
Because this naked political aggression attracted so much attention,
the Chávez regime disavows using the list and claims
to be investigating its origins.
The
list has resurfaced in a new iteration, as an electronic file
called Batalla de Santa Inés Maisanta that contains the
information of more than 12 million registered Venezuelan voters.
The file contains not only the address and whether or not the
individual signed the referendum petition, but also codes his
political affinities and electoral participation rates.[15]
The electronic list is available for purchase both on the streets
of Caracas or at MercadoLibre (Venezuela’s version of
eBay) for less than five dollars.[16]
Although
losing a job or a government contract are by no means on the
same level as gross human rights violations committed under
previous authoritarian regimes in South America, the importance
of these practices, particularly for expressing a political
opinion or exercising an essential political right, should not
be underestimated. Given the overwhelming role of PDVSA (Venezuela’s
state-owned oil enterprise), which accounts for roughly one-third
of the GDP and almost half of Venezuela’s fiscal income,
and the role of the government in the economy more generally--public
spending is equal to almost one-fourth of the nation’s
GDP--government jobs and contracts are in many cases vital for
an individual’s economic well-being. The threat of losing
a government post sends a powerful message that not only threatens
a citizen’s right to cast a secret ballot but to exercise
other constitutional rights in opposition to the government.
Citizen
Chávez: In His Own Words
“In
Venezuela, the Republic is over. . . . There is no social contract,
no State, no serious Executive Branch, no real government, no
real Legislative Branch that legislates according to the needs
of the country, and no Judicial Branch. . . . I will not rule
with political parties.”
Tomás Tenorio Galindo, “La posibilidad del autoritarismo”
[The possibility of authoritarianism], Crónica, December
10, 1998
“In addition to being democratic and peaceful, this Venezuelan
revolution is like Allende’s, but with one difference:
it is not unarmed. This is an armed revolution, and I will say
it again so that there is no mistake: this is a revolution that
has arms to defend itself and we already proved that in April
2002.”
“Venezuela
Referendum: Chávez Reiterates That without Legality
There Will Not Be a Recall Referendum,” Spanish Newswire
Services, September 7, 2003
“I
said it, you all know that the Constitution allows for re-election
only once--in my case, that would be 2007-2013. If the opposition
tries to pull off one of those ugly tricks I’m talking
about or anything else, a coup d’état, or I don’t
know what else . . . I would even activate the constitutional
mechanism that exists, and you all know what that is, to modify
the Constitution and allow for indefinite presidential re-elections,
until . . . 2000 and beyond. 2021, well, or something like that.”
Aló Presidente, April 2, 2006, available at www.minci.gov.ve/alo2.asp?id=166
“We
are in a truly historic battle: in Venezuela, not all that must
die has died yet; in Venezuela, not all that must be born has
yet been born. The day that it has died and the new era has
finished being born, I will be able to calmly go anywhere, but
in the meantime, I will be with you, leading this battle!”
Aló Presidente, May 6, 2006
Blurring the Military-Civilian Line
Chávez
has militarized politics and politicized the military. During
the past several decades, Venezuela has never had a strong separation
between politics, military, and civilian life--although the
military institutions in particular were respected as professional.
Under Chávez, these barriers have been eliminated. Chávez
has interfered in military personnel matters and has given civilian
posts to trusted military comrades.
Chávez
and the Fifth Republic Movement both got their start in the
revolutionary faction of the Venezuelan armed forces, the Movimiento
Boliviano Revolucionario 200 (MBR-200). Chávez first
made his name as a lieutenant colonel in the Venezuelan army
and as one of the junior officers and founding members of MBR-200.
The populist movement was based ideologically on the teachings
of Simon Bolivar. As early as 1982, the group began plotting
a revolutionary coup against the democratically elected civilian
government. A decade later, Chávez made his first television
appearance after admitting defeat during a failed coup attempt
in April 1992, immediately after which he was imprisoned. Although
the coup failed, Chávez was successful in imprinting
his name and image in the hearts of those sectors of the public
that opposed the existing political order. The ideals of the
MBR-200 later were accorded political legitimacy when reconstituted
as the Fifth Republic Movement.
The
1999 constitution was the first step in many of reversing some
of the de jure checks and balances put in place by previous
governments. It further politicized the armed forces by removing
the previous constitutional stipulation that the military maintain
a “non-deliberative” role, giving standing officers
the right to vote, and granting Chávez the power to ultimately
arbitrate military promotions. Chávez’s polemics
then encouraged opposition voices within the armed forces to
retire, while he used his new authority to reward his supporters
within the ranks of the armed services. The promotions were
not just within the armed forces; he rewarded some supporters
with high-level governmental positions (although individuals
did have to retire from the armed forces before serving).
Tension between Chávez and apolitical military professionals
came to a head in April 2002 when senior military personnel
refused Chávez’s order to use military force to
quell civilian demonstrations. Chávez took advantage
of the ouster attempt to further purge opposition from the ranks
of the armed forces.
In an effort to further link the military to the government
and then to economic development under his Fifth Republic Movement,
Chávez has expanded the role of the military into civilian
projects such as his first social assistance program (or misión),
the Plan Bolivar 2000, in which the armed forces replaced state
and municipal governments in regional development projects such
as building infrastructure and performing mass vaccinations.
Chávez
has recently called for restructuring the armed forces, including
increased reserves (from 30,000 in 2004 to 150,000 in 2006)
and the mobilization of the Guardia Territorial (Territorial
Guard) to protect Venezuela against invasions. The latter would
be a completely civilian reserve paid $7.44 per session to train
in physical conditioning, the use of assault weapons, and obstacle
courses that include using tear gas.[17] Already, 1.5 million
civilians have begun the four-month training session; the majority
of these come from the poorer regions of Venezuela where Chávez
enjoys great popular support. Critics charge that the Guardia
Territorial responds directly to Chávez, and therefore
could be used as an instrument of repression.[18]
What
Is to Be Done
The
United States should not seek confrontation with Chávez--but
it will not have to because Chávez will persist in provoking
his arch enemy. However, the United States must walk a fine
line between responding to Chávez’s every provocation
and being straightforward in expressing U.S. concerns regarding
the deterioration of democratic institutions in Venezuela and
Chávez’s destructive, divisive agenda in the hemisphere.
Particularly because so many others nations are reluctant to
speak out in defense of common democratic values, the United
States should not be silent on these issues. But, explains current
assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs
Thomas Shannon Jr., “The purpose is not to allow him to
define the terms of the confrontation and to make sure that
as we engage with him, we are not doing so in a way that harms
our larger interests. . . . It would be a mistake for U.S. policy
in the region to overly concentrate on the guy. If we allow
ourselves to be trapped in the kind of confrontation that he
wants to have with us, it lessens our influence with others
in the region.”[19]
Chávez’s
weekly attacks on the United States and President George W.
Bush are far from undisciplined outbursts. By squaring off against
the “empire” and accusing the United States of planning
to invade Venezuela, Chávez achieves two key objectives:
he denigrates any opponent inside or outside of the country
as a pawn of the United States, and he can portray his domestic
opposition as traitorous agents of an enemy power. Indeed, in
multilateral fora, most Latin and Caribbean leaders are unwilling
to confront Chávez’s excesses at home, in large
part because they do not want to be drawn into Venezuela’s
internal affairs or a bilateral confrontation between the United
States and Chávez.
Latin
Americans must recall the history of militaristic regimes that
have undermined democracy. They must also remember their commitment
under the Inter-American Democratic Charter that “[t]he
peoples of the Americas have the right to democracy, and their
governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.”[20]
Certainly no one expects a single Latin American or Caribbean
leader to confront Chávez. But working as a team--particularly
within fora and at meetings at which the United States is not
present--they should ponder their unique responsibility to their
Venezuelan brothers and sisters. For example, as the Mercosur
countries welcome Chávez with open arms, they should
consider the implications for their own “democracy clause”--one
of the first of its kind in the world. Of course, this requires
our friends in the region to educate themselves about what is
happening in Venezuela and what Chávez is doing to subvert
democracy in their own countries. All of the region’s
leaders should think about what they want history to record
of their actions, as 30 million Venezuelans find themselves
at the mercy of an emerging dictatorship at the dawn of the
21st century.
Chávez’s
direct intervention in the electoral campaigns in other countries
demonstrates that he respects no limits when it comes to advancing
his agenda beyond Venezuela. He has made reckless statements
for and against political candidates in Bolivia, Peru, and Nicaragua,
and he has signed an oil pact to provide support through the
Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) to influence
the ongoing presidential campaign in Nicaragua. His intervention
has finally convinced some Latin Americans that they must speak
up to defend their sovereignty from his imperial designs.
OAS
secretary general Insulza has a mandate from the 2005 General
Assembly to devise proposals for the OAS to respond to “situations
that might affect the workings of the political process of democratic
institutions or the legitimate exercise of power.”[21]
He also has the authority under both the Inter-American Democratic
Charter and the OAS Charter to bring undemocratic practices
to the attention of the OAS Permanent Council. The OAS’s
human rights institutions have been the most categorical in
documenting the abuses of the Chávez regime, although
they have failed, thus far, to impose any effective penalties.
The OAS’s very relevance and credibility are at stake
as Venezuela continues down a path toward dictatorship and the
organization fails to respond effectively.
The OAS, the European Union, and others should refuse to observe
Venezuela’s 2006 presidential elections until significant
changes are made in the rules of the game. International observers
threatened to withdraw their imprimatur from elections in Nicaragua
in 1990 and Peru in 2000, and in both cases the regime in question
relented. If Chávez refuses to overhaul the electoral
machinery of his regime, no international observer should risk
its credibility by being associated with another electoral whitewash
in Venezuela.
International
NGOs--groups of democratic politicians, labor unions, journalists,
lawyers, and human rights advocates--must also make a conscious
effort to close ranks with their colleagues in Venezuela and
take up their cause in international fora. They should also
hold their international conventions in Venezuela to try to
generate global attention to their plight and create the political
space that Venezuelans require to begin to reclaim their future.
The
ultimate responsibility for salvaging Venezuelan democracy rests
with Venezuelans themselves--not merely those who oppose Chávez,
but those who value their own freedom. Whether or not political
parties decide to boycott the upcoming presidential elections
is a decision they must make for themselves. However, it is
an essential obligation of the political opposition in a democracy
to present an alternative vision. Although they have every right
to make substantial election reform a key issue in the public
debate (and perhaps a precondition for their participation),
they must also be able to present a constructive agenda for
the political restoration and social development of a great
nation. To be sure, the inter-national community will be much
more willing and able to support democracy if the country’s
democratic opposition is united, coherent, and engaged responsibly
in the political struggle. Given the record amassed by Chávez,
one would hope that a majority of Venezuelans would take a stand
to secure their essential liberties, to begin to reconcile a
divided country, and to back a political alternative that appeals
to their hopes and not their fears.
AEI
research assistant Megan Davy contributed to this article. AEI
editor Scott R. Palmer worked with the author to edit and produce
this Latin American Outlook.
Notes
1.
“Encuesta versus Estrategia” [Survey versus strategy],
El Nacional (Venezuela), March 19, 2006.
2.
Fabiola Sánchez, “Venezuela Ex-Guerrilla Fighter
Pledges to Take on Chávez in Presidential Elections,”
Associated Press, April 21, 2006.
3.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Follow-up
Report on Compliance by the State of Venezuela with the Recommendations
Made by the IACHR in its Report on the Situation of Human Rights
in Venezuela (2003),” Annual Report of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights 2004, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 Doc. 5 rev.
1, (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 2005),
paragraph 165, available at www.cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/chap.5b.htm.
4.
Amnesty International, Venezuela: Human Rights under Threat
(London: Amnesty International, May 2004), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr530052004.
5.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Follow-up
Report on Compliance by the State of Venezuela.”
6.
Ibid., paragraph 180.
7.
See “Chavez Camp Today Designates 49 New Magistrates,”
El Nacional, December 13, 2004.
8.
Jackson Diehl, “In Venezuela, Locking up the Vote,”
Washington Post, April 10, 2006.
9.
Henrique Capriles Radonski: Comprometido Contigo, “Juicio
a Capriles Radonski Tiene Fecha” [Trial for Capriles Radonski
has a date], April 10, 2006, available at www.caprilesradonski.org.ve/detalle.asp?id=245&plantilla=3.
10.
Elizabeth Núñez, “Imputan a Organización
Civil Súmate por Solicitar Intervención Extranjera”
[The civil organization Súmate is charged with soliciting
foreign intervention], El Nacional, December 27, 2004.
11.
Jackson Diehl, “Locking up the Vote.”
12.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “The IACHR
Expresses Its Concern over the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’s
Passage of the Social Responsibility in Radio and Television
Bill,” news release no. 25/04, November 30, 2004, available
at www.cidh.org/Comunicados/English/2004/25.04.htm.
13.
Fabiola Sánchez, “List of Venezuelan Government
Opponents on Web Site Draws Discrimination Complaints,”
Associated Press Worldstream, May 13, 2005.
14.
Recording of Roger Capela on “Hablemos con Washington,”
Voice of America News, April 26, 2006.
15.
Francisco Olivares, “El Código Chávez”
[The Chávez code], El Universal (Venezuela), May 21,
2005.
16.
“Lista Tascón--Lista Maisanta--Lista Santa Inés--Firmaste?”
[Tascón List--Maisanta List--Santa Inés List--Did
you sign?] MercadoLibre, available at http://articulo.mercadolibre.com.ve/MLV-4956320-lista-tascon-lista-maisanta-lista-santa-ines-firmaste-_JM
(accessed May 8, 2006).
17.
Fabiola Sánchez, “Chávez Prepara un Ejército
de Civiles” [Chávez prepares a civilian army],
Associated Press, April 22, 2006.
18.
Greg Morsbach, “Caracas Prepara Guerra de Guerrillas,”
[Caracas prepares a war of guerrillas], BBCMundo.com, March
6, 2006.
19.
Nicholas Kralev, “Chavez Accused of Ties to Terrorists,”
Washington Times, May 17, 2006.
20.
OAS, Inter-American Democratic Charter, September 11, 2001,
sec. 1, art. 1.
21.
OAS, Declaration of Florida, Delivering the Benefits of Democracy,
AG/DEC.41 (XXXV-O/05), adopted, June 7, 2005.
Robert
Noriega was an assistant secretary of state
for Western Hemisphere affairs (Canada, Latin America, and the
Caribbean) and United States ambassador to the Organization
of American States in the George W. Bush administration, Roger
Noriega is a visiting fellow coordinating the American Enterprise
Institute’s program on Western Hemisphere issues. Petroleumworld
not necessarily share these views.
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