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Saturday's
Lagniappe
The
Geopolitics of Oil
Testimony of Robert D. Hormats
Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs (International)
The
Global Oil Balance and its Implications for U.S. Economic and
National Security Committee on Energy & Natural Resources
United States Senate
January 10, 2007
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for your kind invitation to testify
on the critically important subject of the economic and national
security implications of America’s oil dependence.
I speak to you today as a citizen concerned
about our nation’s increasing dependence on potentially
unstable supplies of foreign oil. This dependence creates profound
economic, political and security vulnerabilities. Also, a portion
of the large amounts of petro-dollars accumulated by a number
of suppliers is used in ways that threaten American interests.
By way of background, I was economic advisor
to Dr. Henry Kissinger on the National Security Council staff
in the mid 1970s when this country experienced its first energy
crisis after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and participated in his
Middle Eastern shuttle diplomacy during the period that followed.
At that time, I had high hopes that the Arab oil embargo, the
sharp increase in the price of oil, and the long-lines at gas
stations would produce a bipartisan consensus on energy policy
and jolt our nation into a bold and effective effort to reduce
oil dependence and future vulnerability. Indeed, some progress
was made. The Energy Policy Conservation Act of 1975, championed
by our late President Gerald R. Ford, launched a number of bold
initiatives to achieve this goal. And the country did accomplish
significant improvements in the efficiency of oil use through
compulsory mileage standards for automobiles and because U.S.
industry and power plants shifted dramatically away from using
oil as a fuel.
But when prices fell later in the decade, a sense of complacency
set in. Then we were hit by another crisis that caused oil prices
to spike at the end of the 1970s; that was triggered by the
fall of the Shah of Iran and the Iranian Revolution. Complacency
set in once again after that crisis receded and prices fell.
Another oil crisis occurred in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait,
after which the sense of urgency about dramatic alterations
in energy policy and use faded again. Decade after decade our
dependence on foreign oil has risen. In the mid-1970s, 35% of
this nation’s oil consumption was supplied by imports.
Now, three decades later, it is 60%.
After 9/11, again at the beginning of the current
Iraq War in 2003, and again during the large price run-up in
and the summer of 2006 the country had excellent opportunities
and powerful incentives to confront energy vulnerabilities with
a bold policy response. The 2005 Energy Policy Act contained
a number of positive features — but these measures were
not commensurate with the seriousness or the urgency of the
energy challenge this country faces.
American dependence on potentially vulnerable
oil supplies continues to grow, with little prospect that it
will change — despite the fact that we are engaged in
a War on Terrorism in which oil imports by the U.S. and other
nations provide funds to nations hostile to the U.S. and countries
friendly to us. It is often said that “9/11 changed everything!”
Sadly, in the area of energy policy it hasn't changed very much.
American oil vulnerability continues unabated.
There are several national economic and security
consequences of this situation:
— If the situation in Iraq continues to
deteriorate and other oil producing nations become more involved,
the risks increase to oil supplies not only from disruptions
in Iraq but also from greater tensions between the Sunni nations
on the western side of the Persian Gulf and the Shiites on the
eastern side, with oil facilities and shipments becoming increasingly
vulnerable. Moreover, added western pressures on Iran over its
nuclear program could lead to oil disruptions or threats thereof;
— The American economy remains highly
vulnerable to supply disruptions in oil exporting nations; these
could result from acts or terrorism, political instability,
efforts to use oil as leverage, or natural calamities;
— High oil prices resulting from strong
demand from countries such as the U.S. and other major importers
give countries such as Iran and Venezuela added resources to
take actions inimical to American interests;
— Oil-dependent friends and allies feel
more vulnerable to the pressures and potential use of oil leverage
from supplying countries and therefore are reluctant to side
with the U.S. on key issues affecting those suppliers;
— Oil-related tensions and competition
are likely to intensify—as countries such as China seek
to lock up scarce supplies or make political deals to solidify
long-term supply relationships, or suppliers such as Russian
and Iran use oil as leverage to extract political concessions
from consumers.
My concerns about this untenable and dangerous
situation led me— together with a group of other concerned
citizens—to join the Energy Security Leadership Council
in an effort to press for greater and more resolute national
action on this matter—and for an end to the divisive,
highly polarized debate that has stymied genuine progress on
many fundamental issues. The Council, a project of Securing
America’s Future Energy (SAFE), is a nonpartisan group
of business executives and retired military leaders. It recently
unveiled a report entitled “Recommendations to the Nation
on Reducing U.S. Oil Dependence.” (I will discuss a few
of these later in my testimony, along with a number of recommendations
that I believe can also contribute to progress in this area.)
The members of the Council believe that America’s energy
security is in a perilous state. Along with my fellow Council
members, I am convinced that America’s leaders must move
quickly and steadfastly to confront our high level of oil dependence
as a profound national security challenge.
ENERGY INTERDEPENDENCE
Calls for “energy independence”
offer a false promise to the American people. They also suggest
a sort of xenophobia that implies that the U.S. can or should
attempt to solve its energy problems with little regard for
those of other nations. In fact, oil is a fungible global commodity,
which means that events affecting supply or demand anywhere
will affect oil consumers everywhere. A country’s exposure
to world oil prices or oil price shocks is a function of the
amount and types of oil it consumes; the ratio of “domestic”
to “imported” oil is only a portion of the problem.
Even if the U.S. could substitute domestic energy for all foreign
oil—a goal the Council believes to be impossible—American
economic prosperity would still be linked to the health of a
global economy dependent on international oil flows. So as we
work to enhance our own energy security we should also be strengthening
international cooperation with oil producers and consumers to
improve global energy security, efficiency, and environmentally
responsible production and usage.
It is also important to make a distinction between
dependence and vulnerability. There are numerous suppliers of
oil that are very reliable and that use the funds earned in
a constructive fashion. There are others whose facilities are
vulnerable to disruption and that use funds in ways inimical
to U.S. interests. But a large portion of the world’s
oil comes from this in the second category, posing a series
of economic, political and security risks.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
The Council recommends a goal of cutting U.S.
oil intensity — the amount of oil it takes to produce
a given amount of GDP—in half by 2030. There is a favorable
precedent for this objective. Since the mid-1970s, the U.S.
has managed to trim oil intensity by 50%, chiefly by raising
the fuel efficiency of passenger cars, virtually eliminating
oil as a fuel for electric power generation, and expanding less
energy-demanding sectors of the economy, particularly in the
area of services. As a consequence, the U.S. now uses half the
amount of oil to produce a dollar of GDP, in real terms, as
it did just thirty years ago. Unfortunately, however, progress
in this area has slowed in the last ten years.
One key goal must be to make America’s
prosperity less dependent on a commodity the production level
of which responds only very slowly to changes in price. Combine
this price inelastic supply with 1) the vulnerability of oil
supplies to various types of disruption, 2) the fact that some
countries see oil as a political as well as an economic commodity,
and 3) the fact that much of the world’s production is
in the hands of state owned oil companies, many of which use
oil revenue for political or social ends rather than reinvest
it in new production capacity, and you have the recipe for severe
energy-related economic disorder.
As a result of the halving of U.S. oil intensity
since the mid-1970s, the high oil prices experienced in the
summer of 2006 represented a smaller relative cost to the economy
than in the past. Further reductions in oil intensity would
provide a measure of insurance against some of the effects of
sudden future oil price shocks or sustained high oil prices.
In addition, by boosting the production of alternative sources
of energy to displace oil, we can create more production capacity
at home, keep more of our money in this country, create a great
number of new, high quality jobs in industries that manufacture
and utilize new environmentally responsible energy production
and conservation technologies, and develop new export products
that can be sold to an energy hungry and environmentally conscious
world.
The Global Energy Challenge
The global economy is in the midst of a period of extraordinary
growth that promises to transform the lives of billions of people,
bringing comforts and luxuries to regions where humankind has
long struggled for subsistence. Creativity and the drive for
a better life are the engines of this tremendous surge in output,
living standards and productivity — but like all engines
they require energy to function.
By 2020, world energy demand is forecast to
jump by 50% over 2000 levels, with most of the increase coming
in developing countries. The safe and affordable delivery of
all this energy is by no means assured. Even if resources turn
out to be sufficient in the aggregate, their distribution will
not map closely to the topography of demand. The resultant uncertainty
of supply and upward pricing pressure will exacerbate international
tensions stemming from non-energy issues.
Oil provides only 40% of global energy, but,
as the premier transportation fuel, it has emerged as the touchstone
of the world’s energy outlook. On both economic and psychological
grounds, oil price spikes threaten the prosperity of many nations,
including many of the poorest on this planet. They also sow
the seeds of tension between exporting and importing nations,
among consuming nations, and among different groups within countries.
Indeed, since so much oil is used for personal transportation,
oil prices have an enormous impact on the pocketbooks of virtually
every American family. Correspondingly, policy efforts that
impact oil’s cost and availability must take into account
the interests of the average American family and quickly become
major political issues.
America’s Clear and Present Dangers
For much of the last century, surplus domestic oil production
reduced U.S. vulnerability to oil disruptions elsewhere in the
world. But America’s oil production is now dwarfed by
current consumption. Thus, while the U.S. remains the third
largest oil producer in the world, domestic production can satisfy
barely 40% of its requirements.
The U.S. generates 28% of the world’s
goods and services while consuming roughly a quarter of its
oil production. This may seem like a balanced, even favorable
energy equation, but closer inspection reveals a different story.
Despite considerable progress toward more efficient energy use,
America requires substantially more oil to create a dollar of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than is the case in most other
developed countries. Some of this differential in “oil
intensity” can be attributed to our nation’s vast
size, the dispersion of our population, and less reliance on
public transportation. Global military obligations, which are
inextricably linked to our commitment to secure the flow of
oil for the benefit of all nations, further increase American
consumption. But even with these extenuating factors, there
can be little doubt that the U.S. can and must use energy far
more efficiently.
America’s long-term supply and demand
balance is no more encouraging. U.S. oil demand is expected
to grow 24% over the next two decades, and even if new discoveries
raise its current 3% share of global oil reserves, our nation
will almost certainly still require substantial amounts of petroleum
imports. Import dependence will also define energy security
for our key allies and most of the world’s manufacturing
nations. Unfortunately, the developed nations that consume most
of the world’s oil are not in a good position to produce
the fuels they need.
A large portion of the world’s oil reserves
are owned by state-owned or controlled oil companies in non-O.E.C.D.
countries. It is worth underscoring this point — especially
because when oil prices were rising last summer there were many
accusations, misguided in my view, that this was a conspiracy
among the big oil majors, when in fact the six largest state
oil companies have ten times the reserves of the top six privately
owned companies. Some of these state companies are highly efficient
and well run, but others are highly politicized and are not
able to utilize their profits to increase production or modernize
capacity. Because of the large state company role in the world’s
oil markets, there is not a “free market” for oil.
As a result, a substantial portion of production is politically
influenced and production decisions and practices are frequently
economically suboptimal.
With each passing year, the global oil trends
now at work—rising consumption, reduced spare production
capacity, politicized spending decisions, and potentially high
levels of instability in key exporting countries—all increase
the likelihood of an energy crisis. The odds in favor of a crisis
are further heightened by the rise of terrorist movements bent
on targeting critical elements of the world’s vulnerable
oil production, processing, and delivery infrastructure.
Given today’s precarious balance between
oil supply and demand, taking even a small amount of oil off
the market could cause prices to rise dramatically. In Oil Shockwave,
a cabinet-level oil crisis simulation conducted in 2005 by SAFE
and the National Commission on Energy Policy (NCEP), a 4% global
shortfall in daily oil supply—only 3.5 million barrels
in a 84 million barrel daily market—resulted in a 177%
increase in the price of oil, to over $150 per barrel. The simulation
was played out by men and women who have served in the highest
ranks of the U.S. government; Robert M. Gates, our current Secretary
of Defense, for example, filled the role of National Security
Advisor. The hypothetical scenarios put before the participants
were designed to simulate a decline in world oil production
due to regional instability and to terrorism. The incidents
were completely plausible, and some, such as unrest in Nigeria,
have subsequently come to pass. But there was little these skilled
officials could do to stop a gut-wrenching increase in the price
of oil. Indeed, one of the major lessons of the simulation was
that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), the emergency supply
of federally owned crude oil, offers only very limited protection
against a major supply disruption. Emergency reserves cannot
sustain the United States through a prolonged crisis, and it
will be extremely difficult to reach political consensus on
when it is appropriate to begin using them.
Even under normal conditions, oil dependence
has severe economic consequences. In 2005, direct outlays for
imported oil accounted for a third of the country’s $800
billion current account deficit. In 2006 prices, these outlays
have gone still higher. By diverting funds away from domestic
consumption and investment, oil imports put a drag on U.S. economic
growth and undercut the nation’s long-term competitive
position. Oil dependence also adds billions to our defense expenditures
by making overseas protection of oil supplies a high strategic
priority.
China
Before I turn to a discussion of recommendations, I want to
touch upon the rise of China and how that impacts U.S. energy
security. Some observers have insisted that clashes between
the U.S. and China over energy are inevitable. Chinese companies
are buying oil properties and concluding long-term supply contracts
around the world. A few of China’s deals are in countries
such as Venezuela, Iran and Sudan, with which the U.S. has strained
or no relations. Also, China’s surge in oil demand was
seen, incorrectly, by some as a reason for higher prices last
summer. And China’s increased coal production concerns
U.S. environmentalists.
But the fact is that the U.S. and China have
many common interests in the energy area and thus many reasons
to cooperate. Consider these facts:
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The U.S. is the world’s biggest oil importer. China is
the world’s fastest growing oil importer. High prices
and supply instability harm both nations. Price increases in
the summer of 2006 primarily reflected the lingering affects
of sluggish world investment in production and refining in the
previous decade, and market perception of high political risk
that could disrupt oil deliveries, which both nations have an
interest in correcting.
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Chinese, like Americans, are concerned about their environment.
China faces colossal and urgent environmental problems, as anyone
who has visited Beijing during the winter has experienced first
hand. U.S. companies have great expertise in clean energy technology
that could help.
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The U.S. and China have a similar interest in open sea lanes
for oil.
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Both nations also desire a secure business and legal environment
for their energy investments in emerging economies as well as
stable and growing supplies from world exporters.
When I look at China and the U.S., I see two
nations that have an enormous interest in cooperation in pursuit
of energy security. Several areas are ripe for a common effort.
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A Joint Business-Government Commission on Clean Coal Technology;
this could help China develop and utilize its massive amounts
of coal in an environmentally responsible way and boost U.S.
exports of technology and equipment in this area.
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Joint research on alternative fuels, which should also include
experts from Japan, would draw on the best talent in these three
countries. This could lead to breakthroughs in, or broader dissemination
of, non-carbon based production and use technologies.
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Strengthen U.S.-China cooperation in the context of the International
Energy Agency.
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Consultation with one another, and with other regional nations,
to maintain open sea lanes; that could reassure China that the
U.S. will not use its naval power to leverage China on oil.
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Strengthen established regional groups that include China, the
U.S., and other Pacific nations to address environmental and
energy supply issues.
Helping China to increase domestic energy output
using state-of-the-art, environmentally responsible, technologies
would slow the growth of its oil import dependence, reduce imbalances
in global markets, dampen global price pressures, and contain
the process of global warming. And cooperation on these broad
energy issues can strengthen broader U.S.–China ties.
The alternative—frequent energy confrontations—benefits
neither country.
There
Are No Silver-Bullet Solutions
Success in improving the nation’s energy security posture
will demand significant public and private investment—supported
by meaningful tax and other non-tax incentives like loan guarantees—over
a sustained period. Because of the volatility of markets and
the strategic role of oil, a considerable amount of government
support is needed to provide the necessary incentives through
a supportive and reliable regulatory, and tax environment if
we are able i) to reduce America’s oil vulnerability;
ii) strengthen this nation’s capacity to produce oil and
alternative sources of energy; and iii) utilize energy more
efficiently and in an environmentally responsible way. The U.S.
is capable of major breakthroughs if all elements of our society
work together.
The good news is that we Americans have it within
our power and our technological and financial capacity to take
meaningful steps to reduce oil dependence and increase energy
security using both proven methods and technologies and our
ingenuity and entrepreneurial capacity to develop new breakthroughs.
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Improving efficiency: In the view of the Council, the most important
thing the U.S. can do to lessen its oil dependence in the near
and medium-term is to utilize oil considerably more efficiently.
With the goal of once again halving oil intensity — as
in the 1980s and 1990s — in the space of two decades,
Americans can do much to protect the economy against the effects
of oil shocks that can be unleashed by forces beyond our control.
Improved vehicle fuel efficiency is the single most important
avenue for further cutting the nation’s oil intensity.
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We
must face the hard fact that in the U.S. oil is primarily a
transportation fuel; unless we can dramatically curb the use
of oil in our cars and trucks, we will be unable to reduce our
oil dependence. Currently the direction is not positive; through
2030 oil usage by SUVs and light duty trucks is expected to
surge by roughly 77%. The transportation sector accounts for
nearly 70% of all the oil the country uses; and oil fuels almost
97% of all transportation. With most of the vehicles on the
nation’s roads operating at efficiency levels far below
what is achievable with currently available technologies, there
is a clear opportunity to realize sizable fuel economy gains
without overall loss of safety or functional utility. We propose
empowering the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) to mandate annual fuel efficiency increases of 4% while
allowing for these increases to be postponed or constrained
if economic, technical, or safety impediments are demonstrated.
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Increasing stable supply. As a second means of improving America’s
oil risk profile, the Council recommends efforts to increase
the production of oil in stable regions of the world, including
in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. We must move beyond the drill/don’t
drill debate for this simple reason: by facilitating the discovery
and recovery of conventional oil resources, in conjunction with
stricter environmental standards, American investment and the
capabilities of this nation’s formidable oil experts and
oil service companies can ease the tight supply conditions that
unsettle oil prices and lessen the probability that even modest
supply shortfalls will trigger an international oil crisis.
By the same token, a robust nuclear power program also makes
great sense.
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Supplies abroad. Just as significantly, by working to ensure
the rule of law, sanctity of contracts, and stable investment
climates abroad, America can help to lower the likelihood of
future disruptions. There a great many potential projects that
can enable the world to diversify the sourcing of oil away from
its present growing concentration on the Middle East. By utilizing
groups such as the International Energy Forum — a ministerial
dialogue among major energy producers and consumers established
in 2003 — the conditions for increased investment in such
projects can be enhanced.
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Developing alternatives. Third, America can lead the way in
expanding the availability of alternatives to petroleum-based
fuels. Diversifying our transportation fuel supply must be a
key part of any comprehensive effort to improve U.S. energy
security. Without an expanded supply of alternatives, conventional
petroleum will continue to power nearly all of our motor transport.
Such reliance on a single non-substitutable input creates profound
economic dangers. To date, through the help of federal policies
such as the Renewable Fuels Standard, the phase-out of MBTE
as an additive, and tax incentives, corn-based ethanol has developed
as one of the most successful domestic alternative transportation
fuels. Production in the United States rose from 1.4 billion
gallons a year in 1995 to about 4 billion in 2005.
Although this growth rate is impressive, it
is merely a drop in the bucket when compared to this nation’s
annual gasoline consumption of 140 billion gallons; it is equivalent
in terms of energy content to only 2% of our gasoline demand.
At a maximum, corn-based ethanol may be able to displace 10%
of our gasoline use before corn demand outstrips supply. Consequently
if we want to have a significant impact on reducing our consumption
of petroleum-based fuels, the federal government must encourage
the development and commercialization not only of dedicated
energy producing crops such as corn and sugar, but also of other
potentially large-volume bio-fuels like cellulosic ethanol (which
are low cost, do not compete with the food chain, and provide
another revenue stream for farmers) that is generated from forest
residue and agricultural waste such as wheat straw , switch
grass, and corn stover. Technologies like cellulosic ethanol
are poised to dramatically raise bio-fuels production by shifting
acreage-to output ratios.
However, to transform this promise into reality,
existing federal policies, like the federal loan guarantee program
for innovative technologies must be fully funded and implemented;
and new policies, which encourage and support investment in
commercial facilities and related transportation infrastructure
must be readily adopted.
There are two specific policy changes that I
believe would enhance the development and commercialization
of renewable energy.
The first is for Congress and the Administration
to take a longer term perspective in the way tax incentives
are structured. For example, with respect to the production
tax credit (PTC) for renewable energy sources like wind and
geothermal, the credit is available to projects that are placed
in service before January 1, 2009. Historically this credit
has been renewed only for short periods of time and often after
great uncertainty and delay. This on-again, off-again process
has added significant uncertainty to such projects and increased
their costs. Therefore a longer-term extension of the PTC, say
for five years would help to avoid such problems.
The second is to alter the structure of tax
incentives to encourage investment from additional categories
of investors, including small investors, by enabling them to
benefit from tax incentives —thereby increasing the availability
and lowering the cost of capital for these projects. For example,
the way the law is now written retail investors and taxpayers
paying the alternative minimum tax cannot use the production
tax credit for investment in wind projects; allowing the use
of master limited partnerships for these types of projects would
broaden the group of investors who could help to finance them.
It is worth noting that many of the new technologies
being developed involve high technical risk, significant costs,
and regulatory uncertainties — and that costs of demonstration
projects to show that these technologies can be deployed on
a commercial scale as well as those associated with their commercial
development are significantly greater than the initial R&D
costs. Therefore, maximizing the range of investors supplying
capital, providing reliable incentives, and creating and funding
policies that reduce the significant financial risks associated
with these projects are critical to advancing the process of
proving and commercializing innovative energy alternatives.
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Managing risks: In the Council’s view, we must manage
risk within the interdependent global oil economy. In our dangerous
world, threats are one commodity not in short supply. America
contributes far more than any other nation to protecting this
global infrastructure, and the time has come for other nations
to expand their own efforts. All nations have an interest in
the stability of the global oil infrastructure, and a variety
of international efforts could help to ensure the smooth flow
of oil. New multilateral accords should play a role, but there
are also opportunities for expanded reliance on existing organizations
such as the Gulf Coordination Council, NATO, or ASEAN. A common
interest in “oil security maintenance” in partnership
with producing nations offers real potential to improve regional
security in areas of rising geopolitical competition by creating
frameworks for pragmatic international cooperation. Where appropriate,
the U.S. should provide exporting countries with diplomatic
support as well as with counter-terrorism training and other
military aid.
I urge you to review the Council’s detailed
recommendations, which are contained in our published report.
We will be glad to provide any further clarifications you may
require.
The
Capabilities of the American People
Last week, the nation mourned the passing of our 38th President,
Gerald R. Ford — for whom I had the great privilege of
working. President Ford left a legacy of honesty, integrity
and decisiveness. These aspects of his leadership were particularly
evident in his handling of energy security. In his 1975 State
of the Union address, President Ford recognized the energy dangers
threatening the country. He expressed a “very deep belief
in America’s capabilities,” — its innovative
capacity and technological skills—to overcome its growing
dependence on imported oil. He also rallied support for fuel
efficiency standards. I share President Ford’s optimism
in the capacity of Americans to respond to the challenge of
growing energy dependence, and his belief that Americans will
rally around tougher energy measures, if they are given strong
leadership.
America has a long history of pulling together
in the face of national security challenges. I am currently
completing a book entitled The Price of Liberty: How America
Pays for its Wars. In all the major national security challenges
of the twentieth century, Americans demonstrated a remarkable
willingness to make patriotic wartime sacrifices. During World
War I and World War II, American’s not only paid dramatically
higher taxes but also participated in massive bond drives to
mobilize billions of dollars to support out troops. Roosevelt’s
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, when asked about
the significance of such drives, said that they were launched
not only to raise massive amounts of funds, but also to respond
to people who asked “What can I do to help.” Today,
the answer to this question lies not in buying more bonds but
in buying less gasoline.
Since 9/11 there have been no major bond drives
as in past wars —and only limited steps to reduce our
dependence on oil. The time has come to recognize that energy
security is central to the national security challenges of twenty-first
century, and to present the American people with the unvarnished
truth regarding how oil affects the struggle in which we are
engaged. We must meet the threats we face in the same spirit
as our parents and grandparents during past wars—with
far-sighted patriotism and willingness to compromise narrow
partisan, ideological, philosophical and economic positions
in the long-tern national interest.
There are enormous dangers in facing the challenges
of a post-9/11 world with a pre-9/11 approach to energy that
relies so heavily on oil from some of the most vulnerable areas
of the world and sustains price levels that benefit countries
such as Iran and Venezuela that seek to undermine our interests
and threaten our friends. American leaders and the American
people have rallied the country in past wars; the challenge
is to do so again,
I thank you again for this opportunity to testify.
Petroleumworld
not necessarily share these views.
