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Saturday's
Lagniappe
Intense
Dispute in the Heart of the Southern Cone
By
Raúl
Zibechi
In
late September and early October, some major moves on the regional
chess board shook up the political situation in Paraguay, Bolivia,
and Uruguay. The moves confirmed that Washington is not the
only player in South America, and must accept multilateralism
as an established reality in the region.
On September
28, Uruguay decided not to sign a free trade agreement with
the United States, a possibility that had been discussed since
the beginning of the year. Paraguay informed Washington on October
2 that it would not renew diplomatic immunity for its troops,
a decision that was made in August. And on October 5, a “war”
broke out between union mine workers and cooperative members
from Huanuni (Bolivia), causing 21 deaths amid rumors of an
imminent coup d'etat in La Paz.
These events
are, without doubt, an indication that something powerful is
happening in the heart of the Southern Cone. At the same time,
the events are all reversible: Uruguay could begin moving, at
a slower pace, toward signing a broad trade agreement with the
United States; Paraguay could turn around and restore immunity
for American troops; and Evo Morales, who has managed to navigate
one of the most difficult moments of his presidency, could still
wind up in a stalemate with right-wing forces.
These events,
and others, led Noam Chomsky to conclude, “The mechanisms
of imperial control … are losing their effectiveness,”
because “ in the Southern Cone especially, from Venezuela
to Argentina, the region is rising to overthrow the legacy of
external domination of the past centuries and the cruel and
destructive social forms that they have helped to establish.”1
The recession
of the empire and the limits being encountered in the region
are due to the rise of the social movements and progressive
governments. In the disputes developing in Paraguay and Bolivia—which
appear to be the most contentious—but also those in Uruguay
and Ecuador, the course of action Brazil takes, and to a lesser
extent Argentina and Venezuela, will be crucial.
The
Fierce Fight for Hegemony
The existing climate in the region is much tenser than it appears.
During the first week of October, the VII Conference of Defense
Ministers of the Americas was held in Managua. Attending were
Donald Rumsfeld, the leader of the Pentagon, and General Bantz
Craddock, the leader of U.S. Southern Command. General Craddock
attacked Venezuela for its role in “destabilizing”
the region, while Rumsfeld warned of the danger of allowing
Nicaraguan SAM-7 missiles to fall into the hands of Sandinistas,
should Daniel Ortega win the presidential elections in November.
At the same
time, Argentina carried out regional military exercises under
“ Operación Hermandad” (Operation Brotherhood)
in which Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela (in
other words, Mercosur plus Bolivia) also participated. On previous
occasions, military actions have tended to focus on recovering
areas occupied by guerrillas or intervening jointly in a country
that had been destabilized by internal crisis. This occasion
represented a significant departure from the usual strategy—the
purpose was “to recover an airport (in the Argentine city
of Posadas) that has fallen under the control of an extra-continental
power, being used to fly in and deploy troops into the area.”2
An analyst
from the New Majority Institute points out, “The only
country with the military capacity to carry out operations of
this sort is the United States.” He concludes that a change
has taken place in the region's military doctrine through the
incorporation of the concept of “asymmetric war,”
to “resist aggression by an extra-continental power with
much greater military might.”
The other
fact to keep in mind is the role of Brazil and Argentina in
this change of course. When Uruguay was on the verge of making
a decision concerning the free trade agreement, the foreign
ministries of Brasilia and Buenos Aires “fine tuned with
great secrecy the details of what would be a harsh and definitive
response to Tabaré Vázquez's early September letter
requesting that member countries of Mercosur allow a degree
of flexibility in negotiating” with the United States.3
The information, released after Uruguay decided against pursuing
the free trade agreement, indicates that Brazil and Argentina
“rejected flat out any possibility of allowing Uruguay
to remain in Mercosur if it signed an individual free trade
agreement with the United States.”
All indications
are that similar pressure was brought to bear on Paraguay. But
there the situation is much more complex. Ever since Paraguay
granted American troops diplomatic immunity in May of 2005,
Mercosur countries—above all Brazil, but also Argentina
and Venezuela—have taken important steps to prevent Paraguay
from becoming a firm ally of the United States. In general terms,
the points of leverage used to accomplish this are the resources
generated by the Itaipú dam (through Brazil's purchase
of energy from Paraguay) and Yacyretá dam (where Argentina
maintained some flexibility on Paraguay's $11 billion debt,
trading it for energy); trade cooperation and the support of
Mercosur's powerful countries in creating a compensation fund
that benefits Paraguay and Uruguay; and also the possibility
of trade and joint investments with Venezuela and Bolivia.
The United
States, for its part, moved its pieces as well, but with a certain
degree of clumsiness. While Asunción only recently made
public its decision not to renew immunity for American troops,
“the former foreign minister, Leila Rachid, officially
informed Washington last August that starting in 2007, Paraguay
would not sign an agreement offering immunity.”4
The United
States immediately began applying pressure by pointing to a
military agreement between Venezuela and Bolivia to construct
headquarters in unprotected border areas. Drugs and contraband
move freely through these areas, and Washington insists Paraguay
will be threatened by Venezuela, by way of Bolivia. The agreement,
signed on May 26, seeks to address Bolivia's need to protect
its 7,000 kilometers of sparsely populated border area facing
a “peaceful invasion” by neighboring countries and
the looting of its natural resources.
The region's
conservative press echoed the “argument” of the
Bush administration. On September 13, both editorial sections
of the Paraguayan-based publications La Naciónand ABCattacked
Evo Morales and Hugo Chavez. According to La Nación,
in an editorial titled “No American Conspiracy,”
“Any rearmament by Bolivia will have repercussions for
Paraguay, and it must take the corresponding action—a
Paraguayan rearmament.” At the same time, it called for
the government to “seek strong alliances” and ended
by affirming that the “guarantee for peace is to be prepared
for war.”5ABC, for its part, accused the “Venezuelan
dictator” of sending weapons to Bolivia, denied the existence
of a military base in Mariscal Estigarribia, and insisted that
“Paraguay does not represent a military threat to any
country.”6
But it was
El Mercurio from Chile that focused most intensely on the supposed
military deployment by Venezuela in Bolivia. In its Sunday October
8 edition, it assures that 24 military bases will be constructed
in Bolivia with the support of Venezuela, which would certainly
arouse the suspicions of Chile, Paraguay, and Peru. According
to the article, “this is just another move in the complex
chess game in which, according to intelligence circles, Morales
is not playing alone. Behind the scenes is the hand of …
Chavez.” As is often the case, the article does not state
its source with precision, but rather, uses only the vague term
“intelligence circles.”
What is
certain is that the conservative press of the region, staunch
allies of Washington, has managed to create a climate of tension
in the face of the Venezuelan “expansion” by appealing
to the traumatic memory of the Chaco War (1932-1935) between
Bolivia and Paraguay, in which 100,000 people died. So far,
of the 24 “bases” conservatives claim will be constructed
in Bolivia, only two have been approved: one on the shore of
the Paraguay River, and another on the border with Brazil. When
asked by El Mercurio, Chile's Defense Minister, Vivianne Blanlot,
assured that the issue of “rearmament” by Bolivia
“has been exaggerated and is not cause for alarm.”7
When Paraguay
announced it would suspend immunity for American troops, the
American Ambassador in Asuncion, James Cason, warned the recently
appointed foreign minister, Rubén Ramírez, about
“the supposed intentions of Bolivia to advance on Paraguayan
territory, with backing from Venezuela.”8 The president
of Paraguay's Congress, Enrique González Quintana, stated
at the same time that Ambassador Cason “told me they had
no knowledge of such an intention by Bolivia concerning Paraguay,
but he also warned me that we shouldn't fall asleep.”9
Bolivia's
Internal Situation
In order to complete the picture of the region, it is worth
stopping to consider the internal situation of Bolivia. Since
the middle of September, rumors have been flying in La Paz over
an effort to destabilize the government of Evo Morales by the
United States and ex-president Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada, now
living there “in exile.” The political climate heated
up abruptly when, during the early morning of October 5, approximately
4,000 miners from independent cooperatives (a sector made up
of small- and medium-sized business owners) attempted to attack,
with weapons and dynamite, the state-owned Posokoni (Huanuni)
mine, where 800 unionized miners work.
The mine
is one of the richest in Bolivia and is coveted by the so-called
cooperative members. Several weeks back, “several cooperative
leaders were denounced for having traveled to London to meet
with official representatives of ex-presidents Jorge ‘Tuto'
Quiroga and Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (both mining executives),
with the objective of selling a block of shares of the Posokoni
mine, privatized in 2002, to the British company Grant Thornton,
which bought out the mining company RGB Resources, PLC the former
concessionaire of the mine.”10 For this reason, Morales
denounced the existence of a “conspiracy” against
his government, based on the fact that the ex-presidents—who
carried out the privatization of the mines and other natural
resources—are acting to destabilize the Bolivian government.
Although
Morales managed to come out ahead after a difficult week, his
government faces serious challenges: friction with Brazil over
the nationalization of hydrocarbons to the possible detriment
of Brazilian-owned oil company Petrobras; increasing difficulty
with the United States over the alliance between Bolivia and
Venezuela and the criticism released by Washington against the
policies of Evo Morales on coca crops; and very serious problems
with the oligarchy of Santa Cruz and the governments of three
other provinces, all of which are seeking autonomy and have
the highest concentrations of the country's natural resources.
This last
issue is one of the most serious in the medium term. There has
been talk of the elite of Santa Cruz, the richest province in
the country, carrying out an attempt to secede, which would
be countered by “an intervention by Venezuelan forces
to disarm the civilian population.”11 Few observers doubt
the existence of paramilitary forces in Santa Cruz that are
training in rural areas and on land belonging to estate-holders
while receiving support from local landowners and large business
owners. Moreover, the existence has been revealed of “a
paper by the Argentine chancellorship estimating a 56% chance
of civil war in Bolivia.”12 If this is true, and if the
surrounding governments are aware of the gravity of the situation
in Bolivia, all the other moves (from the military actions of
Mercosur to the pressure from Washington on Paraguay) make perfect
sense.
Paraguay:
At the Heart of the Dispute
Several days after the Nicanor Duarte Frutos' administration
decided to lift diplomatic immunity from American troops, Ambassador
Cason formally requested the decision be “reviewed.”
But the U.S. embassy in Asunción insisted that conversations
about military cooperation were proceeding normally and there
was speculation that “Washington might make an exception
for Paraguay in order to proceed over the next year with joint
military exercises.”13
Two days
later, in what was interpreted to be a clear “reprisal”
from Washington, Cason declared to the media that the United
States would suspend its “Medrete” medical assistance
program.14 Cason was subsequently criticized for interfering
in Paraguay's internal affairs, and the embassy had to release
a statement in which the ambassador made clear he is not “bothered”
by Paraguay's decision.15
During the
same week of controversy with ambassador Cason (October 8-14),
two news stories made headlines, revealing the scope of the
conflict of interests in Paraguay. On Thursday the 12 th , the
daily newspaper Ultima Hora out of Asuncion broke that the Duarte
Frutos administration voted for Venezuela to become a non-permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council. Obviously, the
United States views this eventuality with concern and is placing
its bet on Guatemala for the same post. According to the article,
on Tuesday the 10 th the ambassador of Paraguay in Caracas informed
the Chavez administration of Duarte Frutos' decision, “situating
Asuncion in a close relationship with the Mercosur countries.”16
Also reported was that “in correspondence with the political
integration of the South American alliance, Paraguay will begin
receiving, in March of 2007, the first $48 million allocated
to improve physical infrastructure and competitiveness.”17
The second
piece of new came out of Venezuela. The state-owned oil company
PDVSA will analyze the feasibility of a project to extract natural
gas and oil from the Chaco region in Paraguay over a period
of 10 months. “There are signs of gas as well as crude
oil,” maintains Jose Humberto Sanchez, a geologist and
PDVSA director of explorations. The Venezuelan-based oil company
supplies Paraguay with 70% of its diesel fuel, providing financial
support for the purchase.
In perspective,
the impression is that towards the end of September and the
beginning of October, the large member countries of Mercosur
scored a victory over Washington, a project they had been working
on since July of 2005, when the first American soldiers arrived
in Paraguay with diplomatic immunity. It is also true, as a
communiqué from the Paraguay Peace and Justice Service
indicated, that the security agencies of the United States continue
to operate; “they are functioning in the country without
any law, like the FBI, DEA, and agents from the CIA, officially
recognized by President Duarte Frutos in July of last year.”
The human rights organization calls for “caution,”
since the governments of Paraguay and the United States may
in fact be “studying a new judicial form that could even
expand the guarantees given to American soldiers.”
Without
doubt, the delicate equilibrium of power requires caution. But
something is changing, and Washington is losing points. For
example, the attempt of the United States to establish a permanent
presence in Paraguay, in reference to the Triple Border, “got
put in the freezer.”18 In essence, all that is happening
during this pressing time in the Southern Cone (to the list
should be added the elections in Brazil and Ecuador) is reversible.
But if we look at the long term, there is an unmistakable shift.
As Chomsky says, “ Of course this shift is highly unwelcome
in Washington, for the traditional reasons: The United States
expects to rely on Latin America as a secure base for resources,
markets and investment opportunities. And as planners have long
emphasized, if this hemisphere is out of control, how can the
United States hope to resist defiance elsewhere?
End
notes
Noam Chomsky, “Latin America Declares Independence.”
Rosendo Fraga, “El factor militar en América Latina.”
“Uruguay distendió el clima del Mercosur”,
Clarín, Buenos Aires, September 30, 2006, online at www.clarin.com.
“EEUU pidió a Paraguay por la inmunidad de sus
tropas”, Clarín, October 7, 2006.
La Nación, Asunción, September 13, 2006, online
at www.lanacion.com.py.
ABC, Asunción, September 13, 2006, online at www.abc.com.py.
El Mercurio, Chile, article by Sergio Espinosa and Andrea Sierra,
October 8, 2006,
online at http://diario.elmercurio.com.
Online at www.infobae.com. October 9, 2006.
Online at www.hoybolivia.com. October 10, 2006.
Luis A. Gómez,“Huanuni y el metal del diablo.”
Rosendo Fraga.
Rosendo Fraga, Negritas mías.
Clarín, October 7, 2006.
Medical Readiness Education and Training Exercises (Medrete).
For a brief description of Medrete, see Raúl Zibechi,
“Paraguay: Platform for Hemispheric Hegemony,” August
18, 2006. Online at http://americas.irc-online.org/am/3441.
“Represalia de EEUU a Paraguay”, October 9, 2006,
online at www.infobae.com.
Wire from Prensa Latina, Asunción, October 12, 2006.
Ibid.
“Paraguay retira trato preferencial a soldados de EEUU,"
Asunción, October 11, 2006, online www.MadridDigital.info.
Sources
Noam Chomsky,
“Latinoamérica declara su independencia,”
The New York Times Syndicate, September 2006.
Rosendo
Fraga, “El factor militar en América Latina,”
October 12, 2006, online at www.nuevamayoria.com.
Luis A.
Gómez, “Huanuni y el metal del diablo,” Brecha
(Uruguay), October 13, 2006, online at www.brecha.com.uy.
Serpay-Py
(Servicio Paz y Justicia-Paraguay), “¿Retiro de
inmunidad a cambio de qué,” Asunción, October
6, 2006.
Raúl
Zibechi, “Paraguay: Platform for Hemispheric Hegemony,”
August 18, 2006. Online at http://americas.irc-online.org/am/3441.
Raúl
Zibechi,
a member of the editorial board of the weekly Brecha de Montevideo,
is a professor and researcher on social movements at the Multiversidad
Franciscana de America Latina and adviser to several grassroots
organizations. He is a monthly contributor to the IRC Americas
Program (www.americaspolicy.org).
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